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PROBLEMS OF JURY DISCRETION
IN CAPITAL CASES
Robert E. Knowlton t
Many statutes require the jury to determine whether the death
penalty shall be inflicted after conviction for certain crimes. It is the
purpose of this article to analyze these statutes and the reasons for
their enactment; to ascertain their place in the movement against
capital punishment; to discuss the problems raised by these statutes;
and finally, to make recommendations for a more rational method for
distinguishing between offenders who are to be capitally punished and
those who are not.
The American colonial laws which imposed the death penalty were
never as numerous as their English counterparts,' and the movement
to limit capital punishment to even fewer crimes gained added momen-
tum after the Revolutionary War. In 1788 Ohio limited capital
punishment to murder.2 In 1794 Pennsylvania passed the first statute
dividing murder into degrees and provided that the death penalty could
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1. BYE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 3 (1919); SUTHER-
LAND, CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1924). With regard to the English law, see 4 BL. CoMM.
*18 (where it is said that one hundred and sixty crimes were punishable by death) ;
HALL, THEYT, LAW AND SocIaY 85 (1935) (where it is said that the total number
of capital crimes at the end of George III's reign was two hundred and twenty-two).
For a breakdown of the number of capital statutes enacted during different periods of
English history, see RADzINOwIcz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 4, 5
(1948).
In regard to the colonial law, see Keedy, History of the Penisylvania Statute
Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 759 (1949) ; the Duke of York's
Laws, 1 N.Y. COLONIAL LAWS 1664-1719, 20 (1894) which made ten crimes punish-
able by death; Acts and Laws of His Majesty's English Colony of Connecticut
(1750) wherein twelve offenses are capital; BYE, supra, where it is said most New
England colonies made twelve offenses capital, but Rhode Island punished only ten
by death.
2. Shipley, Does CaPital Punishment Prevent Convictions? 43 Am. L. Rxv.
327 (1909). (1099)
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be imposed only upon conviction for a murder falling within the
definition of the first degree.' In 1847 Michigan permanently abolished
capital punishment,4 and in the intervening period, several other states
have followed her lead with varying degrees of permanence.5 In the
great majority of the states the death penalty has been retained for one
or more crimes, but its imposition in any given case has been made a
matter for the jury to determine.
From the foregoing it is obvious that capital punishment has been
limited extensively by decreasing the number of crimes punishable by
death and by providing that only certain cases coming within the com-
mon law definition of the crime should be capitally punished. This
second limitation has been accomplished by providing that the jury
or the judge may determine upon which cases the penalty of death
shall be imposed and by dividing murder into degrees.
A survey of state and Federal murder statutes shows that thirty-
five states and the Federal Government provide that the jury shall
determine whether the death penalty shall be imposed,' four provide
3. Keedy, supra note 1, at 772-3.
4. Shipley, supra note 2, at 330. Actually, Michigan, by statute, still punishes
treason by death. MicH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 28.812 (1938). However, there has
never been a conviction under this statute, so Michigan is generally considered as
having abolished capital punishment.
5. States where the death penalty was abolished and later restored:
Name of State Date of Abolition Date of Restoration
Arizona 1917 1919
Colorado 1897 1901
Iowa 1872 1878
Missouri 1917 1919
Oregon 1914 1920
Washington 1913 1919
Chart from Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the
United States, 17 J. Cani. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 240 (1926). Since that time
Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 21, § 21-403 (Corrick 1949), and South Dakota,
S.D. Laws 1939, c. 30, p. 40, have reinstituted the death penalty. None of the states
above listed have again abolished the death penalty. Maine is not shown in the above
chart, because it abolished, restored, and abolished the death penalty again before the
chart was made.
6. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 318 (1940); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 43-2903 (1939); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2227, 43-2153 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 190 (Deering 1941);
CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §32 (1935); FLA. STAT. §§782.04, 919.23(1), (2) (1951);
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (1933); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 38, § 360 (1935); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3401, 9-1819 (Burns 1933); IowA CODE
§§690.2, 690.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANY. § 21-403 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT.
§§431.130, 435.010 (1948) ; LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 30; tit. 15, § 409 (1950)
MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 27, § 500 (1951) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2217 (1942);
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 559.030 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-2505, 94-7412
(1947); NED. REV. STAT. § 28-401 (1943); Nev. Stat. 1947, c. 91, § 121; N.H. REv.
LAWS c. 455, §§ 4, 5 (1942) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, c. 113, §§2, 4 (1953);
N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 41, § 41-2410 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 14, § 14-17 (Supp.
1951) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 12400 (1938) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 707; tit. 22,
§ 927 (1941); ORE Comsp. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, c. 4, § 23-411 (1940) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1945) ; S.C. CODE § 16-52 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10771,
10772 (1943); TEX. PENAL CODE C. 16, art. 1257 (Vernon 1936) ; TEX. CODE CRIM.
Paoc. ANN. art. 693 (1941); VA. CODE tit. 18, § 31; tit. 19, §223 (1950); WASH.
REv. CODE tit. 9, § 9.48.030 (1951) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§5917, 6204 (1949);
Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §9-201 (1945); 18 U.S.C. §§454, 567 (1946).
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that the jury may recommend the punishment to be inflicted but that
such a recommendation shall not be binding upon the judge,7 and six
have abolished the death penalty for murder,' leaving only three that
still require capital punishment.' Twenty-six states and the Federal
Government divide murder into degrees and in addition, allow the jury
to determine when a defendant convicted of first degree murder shall
be sentenced to death.' 0 Of the four states which allow the jury to
make a recommendation not binding upon the judge, only South
Dakota " does not divide murder into degrees.
In summation, it is evident that all states except the six which
have abolished the death penalty have limited capital punishment as
it relates to murder by providing that only certain homicides coming
within the common law crime shall be capitally punished. In ac-
complishing this limitation, the majority of states had divided murder
into degrees, and have provided that the jury, or the jury and the
judge together will have the right to determine the cases of first degree
murder to be capitally punished.
THE STATUTES
Statutes which give the jury the right to determine the punish-
ment may be divided into two main groups. In the first group the
statutes provide for alternate penalties, the jury to impose one or the
other upon conviction. Most of the states in this group have statutes
7. DEL. REv. CODE c. 149, §§ 1, 4 (1935); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1045, 1045a
(Discretion limited to cases wherein killing without a "premeditated design to effect
the death of any individual; or without a design to effect death, by a person engaged
in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony. . . ." § 1044 (2)) ; S.D.
Laws 1939, c. 30, p. 40; UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 103, c. 28, §4 (1943).
8. ME. Rrv. STAT. c. 117, § 1 (1944); MIcH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 28.548
(1938); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 619.07 (1947); N.D. RFv. CODE § 12-2713 (1943)
(unless committed by a person already under life sentence for murder in the first
degree); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 606, § 2 (1938) (unless committed by a person under
a sentence of life imprisonment) ; Wis. STAT. § 340.02 (1947).
9. CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 8351 (1949); MASS. ANN. LAWs c. 265, § 2 (1933);
VT. REv. STAT. § 8242 (1947).
10. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 318 (1940) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. §§ 43-2227, 43-2903 (1939);
ARK. STAT. ANN. h' 41-2227, 43-2153 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 190 (Deering
1941); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 32 (1935); IDAHo CODE § 18-4004 (1948); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3401, 9-1819 (Burns 1933); IOWA CODE §§ 690.2, 690.5 (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21403 (1949) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 27, § 500
(1939); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§559.010, 559.030 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§94-2505, 94-712 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §28401 (1943); Nev. Stat. 1947,
c. 91 § 121; N.H. REv. LAWS c. 455, §§ 4, 5 (1942) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, c. 113,
§§ 2, 4 (1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 41, § 2410 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 14, § 17
(Supp. 1951) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 12400 (1938); OR. Comp. LAWS ANN. tit.
23, c. 4, §23411 (1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (Purdon 1945); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 10771, 10772 (1943); VA. CODE tit. 18, §31; tit. 19, §223 (1950);
WASH. REv. CODE tit. 9, §9A8.030 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§5917, 6204
(1949); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §9-201 (1945); 18 U.S.C. §§454, 567 (1946).
11. S.D. Laws 1939, c. 30, p. 40.
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that provide for either life imprisonment or death."2 Four states ",
allow the jury to impose imprisonment for a term of years up to and
including life, or the death sentence. Twenty states have statutes which
provide for alternate penalties, and all of these statutes divide murder
into degrees except four.14
In the second main group the statutes provide for the imposition
of a given penalty unless the jury by its verdict imposes another. In
the majority of these states the statutes impose the death penalty unless
the jury changes it to life imprisonment; 1r the statutes of two states 16
provide for life imprisonment unless the jury imposes death. Of the
fifteen states (and the Federal Government) which have this type of
statute, only five '1 do not divide murder into degrees.
Two reasons have been advanced for the enactment of the afore-
mentioned statutes. One reason bases their passage upon an attempt
to prevent jury nullification; ' the other, upon the legislatures' realiza-
12. ALA. CoDE tit. 14, § 318 (1940); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-2903 (1939) ; 'CAL.
PEN. CODE § 190 (Deering 1941) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 32 (1935) ; IDAHO CODE
§ 18-4004 (1948) ; InD. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3401, 9-1819 (Burns 1933); IOWA CODE
§§ 690.2, 690.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-403 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§431.130, 435.010 (1948); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 559.030 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 94-2505 (1947); Nu. REV. STAT. § 28-401 (1943); Nev. Stat. 1947, c. 91,
§ 121; OF:LA. STAT. tit. 21, § 707 (1941); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon
1945).
13. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 38, § 360 (1935) ("... for a term not less than fourteen
years.") ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 10771 (1943) ("... or be imprisoned for life or
over twenty years. . . ."); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. C. 16, art. 1257 (1936); TEx.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 693 (1941) (". . . or for any term of years not less
than two.") ; VA. CODE tit. 18, § 31; tit. 19, § 223 (1950) ("... or for any term
not less than twenty years.").
14. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 38, §360 (1935); Ky. REv. STAT. §§431.130, 435.010
(1948); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 707; tit. 22, §927 (1941); TEx. PEN. CODE C. 16,
art. 1257 (1936); TEN. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 693 (1941).
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2227, 43-2153 (1947); FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04,
919.23(1), (2) (1951); GA. CODE ANN. §26-1001 (1933); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14,
§30; tit. 15, §409 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS C. 27, §500 (1951);
Miss. CODE ANN. §2217 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. C. 14, §14-17 (Supp. 1951);
N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, c. 113, §§2, 4 (1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 41, § 41-2410
(1941); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 12400 (1938); ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANN. tit. 23,
c. 4 § 23-411 (1940); S.C. CODE § 16-52 (1952); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5917,
6204 (1949); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §9-201 (1945); 18 U.S.C. §§454, 567
(1946).
16. WASH. REv. CODE tit. 9, § 9.48.030 (1951) ; N.H. REv. LAWS c. 455 §§ 4, 5
(1942).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04, 919.23(1), (2) (1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005
(1933); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 14, §30; tit. 15, §409 (1950) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2217
(1942); S.C. CODE § 16-52 (1952).
18. Case, J: ". . . the object of the legislation was not primarily to benefit a
person undergoing trial for murder but, on the contrary, was to so accommodate the
law to the psychology of jurors that convictions of first degree murder might be
reached when deserved. . . ." State v. Molnar, 133 N.J.L. 327, 334, 44 A.2d 197,
202 (1945). See Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 152, 143 Atl. 904, 906-907
(1928). For a description of jury nullification in other times, see HALL, THEFT,
LAW AND SocIETY 87-98 (1935); RADZIN0WICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL
LAW 94-97 (1948). It is interesting to note that in those instances, the judge and
the prosecuting attorneys sanctioned and encouraged the jury's "pious perjury."
That does not appear to have been the case in regard to the jury's nullification of
the first degree murder statute.
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tion that some cases of first degree murder did not deserve to be
capitally punished. 9 It is quite probable that both reasons contributed
to the enactment of these statutes, for they are not in conflict with
each other.20
Effect of the Statutes Upon Defendants' Right to Bail
Of the thirty-six jurisdictions having statutes which permit the
jury to establish the punishment, twenty-five have constitutional provi-
sions which allow the defendant bail as a matter of right, except in
capital cases where proof is evident or presumption great.2 ' It is
well settled that abolition of the death penalty gives all defendants bail
as a matter of right, even though the crime for which they are indicted
had heretofore been punishable by death.22  The question arises as to
whether giving the jury the discretion in murder cases destroys the
capital nature of the crime.
The majority of jurisdictions hold that the jury's privilege to
impose a sentence less than death does not give the defendant a con-
stitutional right to bail.23  Such courts define a "capital case" as any
case in which the penalty "may" be death. 4 However, the Missouri
court has said that the phrases requiring the proof to be evident or the
presumption great require that before bail is denied the evidence be
such that the jury will likely impose the death penalty.
25
19. Harlan, J: "The statute evidently proceeds upon the ground that there may
be cases of murder in the first degree, the punishment for which by imprisonment
for life at hard labor will suffice to meet the ends of public justice." Calton v.
Utah, 130 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1889). See People v. Leary, 105 Cal. 486, 496, 39 Pac.
24, 26 (1895).
20. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948).
21. ALA. CONST. Art. I, § 16; ARiz. CoNsT. Art. II, § 22; ARK. CONsT. Art. II,
§8; CAmF. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6; COLO. CoNsT. Art. II, § 19; FLA. CONST. D.R. § 9;
IDAHO CoNsT. Art. I, § 6; ILL CONsT. Art. II, § 7; IOWA CONsT. Art. I, § 12;
KAN. CorsT. B.R. § 9; Ky. CoNsr. § 16; Miss. CONsT. Art. III, §29; Mo. CONST.
Art. I, § 20; MONT. CoNsT. Art. III, § 19; Nay. CONST. Art. I, §7; N.J. CONST.
Art. I, p. 10; N.M. CONST. Art. II, § 13; OHIO CONsT. Art. I, § 9; OKLA. CoNST.
Art. II, § 8; PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 14; S.C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 20; TENN. CONST. Art. I,
§ 15; TEX. CoNsT. Art. I, § 11; WASH. CONsT. ART. I, § 20; Wyo. CONST. Art. I,
§ 14. A typical provision reads as follows: "All prisoners bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offences when the proof is evident or the presumption
great. . . ." PA. CONST. Art. I, § 14.
22. Re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 163 Pac. 264 (1917) ; Re Perry, 19 Wis. 676
(1863) ; In re Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 188 Pac. 424 (1920). The prisoner is not entitled
to bail as a matter of right if the crime of which he is accused was punishable by
death at the time of its commission, even though the death penalty has been abolished
subsequently. In re Schneck, 78 Kan. 207, 96 Pac. 43 (1908).
23. Ex parte McCrary, 22 Ala. 65 (1853) ; Ex parte McAnally, 53 Ala. 495
(1875) ; Ex parle Fortenberry, 53 Miss. 428 (1876) ; Ex parte Dusenberry, 97 Mo.
504, 11 S.W. 217 (1888); Ex parte Nagel, 41 Nev. 86, 167 Pac. 689 (1917).
24. Cases cited note 23 m.pra; note 29 infra; Lee v. State, 31 Ala. App. 91, 13
So.2d 583 (1943).
25. Walker, J: "What is meant by the presence of proof evident, or its alterna-
tive, presumption great, is simply that if the evidence is clear and strong, leaving
a well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been
19531
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It is uniformly held that the constitutional right to bail does not
require that it be granted after conviction pending an appeal. 26  How-
ever, several states have statutes which are specifically applicable to
post-conviction cases and use the terminology "capital cases." 27 If
the jury has imposed the death penalty, the case is obviously capital.
On the other hand, if the jury has imposed life imprisonment, there is
merit in the argument that bail should be granted. This contention
would be of even greater significance should the courts rule that the
jury could not raise the punishment if the case is later reversed and
remanded. Only one state has held that a defendant may have bail
as a matter of right when the jury has determined that the punishment
be life imprisonment.2" The rest of the states follow the same reason-
ing as that applied under the constitution in a pre-conviction case.29
The practical reason for the limitation upon the right to bail in
capital cases is the fear that the defendant will escape. The nature of
the punishment in such cases makes great the probability of flight."
The question which arises upon these constitutional sections is whether
or not the jury's power to impose life imprisonment instead of death
materially affects the probability of flight. It would seem that few
prisoners would refuse to flee if given the opportunity merely because
the jury might impose life imprisonment instead of death." Defining
''capital cases" as those in which the death penalty "may" be imposed
is, therefore, justifiable upon grounds of policy.
committed as charged and that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he would
probably be punished capitally if the law is administered, bail is not a matter of
right, and should be refused." Ex parte Burgess, 309 Mo. 397, 406, 274 S.W. 423,
426 (1925) (Italics added). On the basis of this dictum, the court in Ex parte
Dawson, 190 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. App. 1945) granted bail because it felt that no jury
would impose the death penalty on the basis of the evidence.
26. Ex parte Voll, 41 Cal. 29 (1871) ; ip re Halsey, 124 Ohio St. 318, 178 N.E.
271 (1931) ; Ex parte Herndon, 18 Okla. Cr. 68, 192 Pac. 820 (1920). For a com-
pilation of cases upon this point see Notes, 19 A.L.R. 805 (1922) ; 77 A.L.R. 1235-6
(1932).
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-2714 (1947) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 609 (1935);
N.J. REv. ANN. STAT. §2:195-11 (1937); WASH. REv. CODE tit. 10, §10.73.040
(1951).
28. Walker v. State, 137 Ark. 402, 209 S.W. 86 (1919).
29. People v. St. Lucia, 315 Ill. 258, 146 N.E. 183 (1924); State v. Baronne,
96 NJ.L. 374, 114 Atl. 809 (1921); In re Baronne, 97 N.J.L. '249, 117 At. 163
(1922); Ex parte Berry, 198 Wash. 317, 88 P.2d 427 (1939). See also, State v.
Christensen, 165 Kan. 585, 195 P.2d 592 (1948).
30. "And where the probabilities of flight are overwhelming, there should be no
bail. Thus, -2. A Capital Crime,-with guilt and conviction certain, is of this
sort. . . '" 1 Bisnop, NEmv CRIMINAL PRocEmuR § 255-1, 2 (2d ed. 1913). For a
brief history of bail in early English law, see 4 BL CoMM-. * 293-297.
31. The effect of the jury's power to determine the punishment upon the desire
of the defendant to flee might depend upon the type of murder statute involved.
There presumably would be less need for flight in those jurisdictions wherein the
statute imposed life imprisonment with the jury having the power to impose death,
than in those areas wherein the statute imposed death with the jury having a right
to change the penalty to life imprisonment.
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Requirement that the proof be evident or the presumption great
is predicated upon the belief that the possibility of acquittal lessens
the probability of flight. To say that this requires the evidence to be
such as will likely cause the jury to impose the death penalty seems
* to misconstrue this section of the constitution. The constitution re-
quires that before a defendant can be denied bail, as a matter of right
he must be accused in a "capital case" and the proof be evident or the
presumption great that he committed the crime. To require that the
jury will likely impose the death penalty is to say that the presumption
must be great that the crime is capital, rather than that the presump-
tion be great that the defendant committed the crime. Aside from
this, the interpretation requires that there be at least a minimum degree
of certainty in the prediction of which punishment the jury will impose.
Under the present approach of the majority of jurisdictions, the jury
is allowed an untrammeled and arbitrary discretion. It is, therefore,
extremely difficult to foretell what twelve unknown jurors will impose
as the punishment at some future date. From the viewpoint of the
defendant, little solace can be gained from the declaration that the
jury would not be likely to impose the death penalty. Thus, the
probability of flight would not be greatly alleviated. It would seem,
therefore, that the defendant in a first degree murder case should not
be entitled to bail as a matter of right, either before or after conviction.
This would be true even after a conviction and an imposition of a life
sentence, when the jury upon a retrial could raise the punishment to
death.
Challenge of Prospective Jurors for Conscientious Scruples Against
the Death Penalty
Conscientious scruples against the death penalty were grounds for
a challenge for cause when punishment for murder was a compulsory
death sentence."2 States which allow the jury to impose a sentence
less than death have almost unanimously continued to permit the prose-
cuting attorney to challenge for cause any prospective juror with such
scruples.33 However, the juror cannot be required to state which
32. 1 THOMPSON, TRiALs § 74 (2d ed. 1912) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 1600 (10th ed. 1918).
33. Johnson v. State, 203 Ala. 30, 81 So. 820 (1919); Leigh v. Territory, 10
Ariz. 129, 85 Pac. 948 (1906); Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S.W. 186 (1915);
People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940) ; Shank v. People, 79 Colo.
576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926) ; Swain v. State, 162 Ga. 777, 135 S.E. 187 (1926) ; State
v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 243 Pac. 359 (1925); People v. Winchester, 352 Ill. 237,
185 N.E. 580 (1933); Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 11 N.E. 360 (1886);
Smith v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 133, 37 S.W. 586 (1896); State v. Ledet, 211
La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947); Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1945);
Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19 (1881); State v. Pinkston, 336 Mo. 614, 79 S.W.2d
1953]
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punishment he would impose, given a hypothetical statement of future
contingencies.
3 4
Many jurisdictions have statutory rules of criminal procedure
which allow a challenge for cause for conscientious scruples against
the death penalty in "capital cases" or in cases wherein the offense
charged is "punishable with death." Murder cases may be brought
within this class by defining "capital cases" as those wherein the death
penalty "may" be imposed and by saying that "punishable by death"
means "may be so punished." " A more difficult problem is presented
by the statutes which require the juror's scruples to be such as to
"preclude him from finding any defendant guilty of an offense punish-
able with death. . . ." " Since a juror could impose life imprison-
ment, it is difficult to see how scruples against the death penalty could
prevent convictions. The courts have sustained challenges for cause
under this statute by saying that since the juror would not be "free
to render any verdict that the circumstances of the case call for," he
would be within the meaning of the aforementioned procedural rule.37
Several courts have arrived at the same result without such statu-
tory rules of criminal procedure. Unfettered by statute, these courts
have been free to place their rule upon broad considerations of public
policy. Reasons set forth for giving the state this ground for a chal-
lenge for cause have been: (1) the jurors are required to exercise
their discretion upon the facts of the case, and if they have scruples
against the death penalty, they cannot do this; s (2) if the state has
to accept such jurors, it is being required to abandon one of the two
possible verdicts of the case; " (3) the state has a right to a jury with
1046 (1935); State v. Won, 76 Mont. 509, 248 Pac. 201 (1926) ; Taylor v. State,
86 Neb. 795, 126 N.W. 752 (1910) ; State v. Comery, 78 N.H. 6, 95 Atl. 670 (1915) ;
State v. Juliano, 103 N.J.L. 663, 138 At. 575 (1927) ; Smith v. State, 5 Okla. Cr.
282, 114 Pac. 350 (1911) ; Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938) ;
Gonzales v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 508, 21 S.W. 253 (1893) ; State v. Condit, 101
Utah 558, 125 P.2d 801 (1942) ; State v. Leuch, 198 Wash. 331, 88 P.2d 440 (1939)
State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 285 Pac. 803 (1930).
34. State v. Pinkston, 336 Mo. 614, 79 S.W.2d 1046 (1935).
35. As to the phrase "capital cases" see Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 11
N.E. 360 (1886); State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947). As to the
phrase "punishable with death" see Leigh v. Territory, 10 Ariz. 129, 85 Pac. 948
(1906) ; People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940) ; Smith v. Common-
wealth, 100 Ky. 133, 37 S.W. 586 (1896) ; State v. Pinkston, 336 Mo. 614, 79 S.W.2d
1046 (1935) ; Taylor v. State, 86 Neb. 795, 126 N.W. 752 (1910) ; Smith v. State, 5
Okla. Cr. 282, 114 Pac. 350 (1911) ; Gonzales v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 508, 21
S.W. 253 (1893) ; State v. Leuch, 198 Wash. 331, 88 P.2d 440 (1939).
36. See statutes in People v. Rollins, 179 Cal. 793, 179 Pac. 209 (1919); State
v. Pinkston, 336 Mo. 614, 79 S.W.2d 1046 (1935); Taylor v. State, 86 Neb. 795,
126 N.W. 752 (1910) ; Smith v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 282, 114 Pac. 350 (1911).
37. People v. Rollins, 179 Cal. 793, 179 Pac. 209 (1919); State v. Leuch, 198
Wash. 331, 88 P.2d 440 (1939).
38. Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926).
39. Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19, 22 (1881).
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an open mind on the question of punishment; 40 and (4) the challenge
for cause is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.41
The Iowa court in State v. Lee 42 held that a prospective juror
could not be challenged for cause because of conscientious scruples
against the death penalty, the reason for this being that the Iowa
legislature had deleted the ground for challenge for implied bias '
from the statute. The Iowa court had held in another case that a juror
may be examined as to scruples against capital punishment on his voir
dire to form a basis for the use of counsel's peremptory challenges.
44
The best reason for allowing the state to challenge a juror for
cause when he has scruples against capital punishment is stated in
Shank v. People 41 wherein Justice Burke, in commenting upon the
purpose of the statute allowing the jury to determine the punishment,
said: "Its purpose to have that discretion exercised according to the
facts is evident. A juror who, by reason of conscientious scruples,
cannot fix the death penalty on any state of facts, has no discretion to
exercise.
This reasoning would appear to give the defendant the right to
challenge for cause a juror who says that he would not consider any
penalty but death. The Utah court in State v. Thorne 47 held that it
was not error for the trial court to overrule the defendant's challenge
for cause of a juror who would refuse to consider a recommendation
of life imprisonment. The court said that scruples against capital
punishment would be grounds for the state to challenge the juror
for cause, but that since the judge could neither influence nor control
the jury's discretion, the defendant's challenge could not be sustained. 48
The inconsistency of the reasoning is apparent. If sustaining the de-
°fendant's challenge for cause were interfering with the exercise of
discretion, sustaining the state's challenge, when the juror had scruples
against imposing death, would likewise be interfering. The better
view would seem to be to allow both the defendant and the state to
challenge a prospective juror for cause when the juror would be unable
to exercise the discretion upon the facts of the case.
40. State v. Juliano, 103 N.J.L. 663, 138 Atl. 575 (1927); Commonwealth v.
Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938).
41. Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938).
42. 91 Iowa 499, 60 N.W. 119 (1894).
43. Id. at 502, 60 N.W. at 120.
44. State v. Dooley, 89 Iowa 584, 57 N.W. 414 (1894). See also State v.
Garrington, 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).
45. 79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926).
46. Id. at 582, 583, 247 Pac. at 562.
47. 41 Utah 414, 126 Pac. 286 (1912).
48. Id. at 419-420, 126 Pac. at 288-289.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE RELEVANT SOLELY TO PUNISHM-ENT
After the jury has been chosen and the trial has commenced, the
first problem to arise in connection with statutes which permit the
jury to determine the punishment is whether evidence may be intro-
duced which is relevant solely to punishment. None of the statutes
giving the jury the right to decide the penalty are useful in the solution
of this question. As a result of the legislative silence, such evidence
is admissible in some states but not in others. The view that evidence
relevant solely to punishment is not admissible was well stated by
Chancellor Walker in the case of State v. James,49 wherein he said:
"It is a general principle that an issue must be single and certain and
that an irrelevant one will not be permitted to be tried. This rule
precluded the proffered evidence, and its exclusion was correct." 5o
This principle which excludes all evidence relevant solely to
punishment is still applied in New Jersey.5 Certain other states have
also adopted broad language prohibiting the introduction of such evi-
dence.5" Chief Justice Angellotti of the California Supreme Court
said in People v. Witt: ". . . the determination of the jury, under
the provisions of section 190 of the Penal Code, as to death or life
imprisonment, is necessarily to be based solely on such evidence as is
admissible on the issues made by the indictment or information and the
plea of the defendant." "
The holding of the case was that evidence of the defendant's charac-
ter and past habits was not admissible.5" The dictum has been applied
in several cases to prevent the admission of evidence of mental defects
which the defendants have attempted to introduce in mitigation of
punishment." On the other hand, the California court has held that
the state may introduce evidence that the defendant was serving a life
sentence at the time of the killing for which he is being tried."6 Such
evidence was held admissible "as tending to enlighten the jury on the
very important matter of the extent of the punishment to be fixed by
49. 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 At. 553 (1921).
50. Id. at 151, 114 Atl. at 560-561.
51. Cordasco v. State, 2 N.J. 189, 66 A.2d 27 (1949).
52. Campbell v. Territory, 14 Ariz. 109, 125 Pac. 717 (1912) ; Gardner v. State,
90 Ga. 310, 17 S.E. 86 (1892) ; State v. Tranmer, 39 Nev. 142, 154 Pac. 80 (1915);
Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. 214 (1935).
53. 170 Cal. 104, 110-111, 148 Pac. 928, 930 (1915).
54. Ibid.
55. People v. Golsh, 63 Cal. App. 609, 613, 219 Pac. 456, 458 (1923); People
v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 47, 273 Pac. 767, 772 (1928); People v. French, 12 Cal.2d
720, 737, 87 P.2d 1014, 1024 (1939); cf. People v. Perry, 195 ,Cal. 623, 639, 234
Pac. 890, 897 (1925); People v. Leong Fook 206 Cal. 64, 71, 273 Pac. 779, 781
(1928); People v. Pantages, 212 Cal. 237, 271-277, 297 Pac. 890, 904-907 (1931).
56. People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387 (1882); People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451,
249 Pac. 859 (1926).
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the jury in the exercise of its discretion." 17 In People v. Larrios" the
California Supreme Court indicated that a defendant should, "as against
technical objections, be permitted to state, within reasonable limitations
something of his background." " The court, however, held that the
defendant had not been injured by the 'lower court's refusal to permit
the introduction of the evidence.6" In a more recent case,6 the
California court, in holding that evidence of the defendant's claimed
mental defect 62 was inadmissible, seemingly reverted to a rigid applica-
tion of the dictum of the Witt case.13  There was, however, a strong
dissent in which it was stated that to refuse the introduction of such
evidence was a denial of due process, because it required the jury to
determine the punishment in utter ignorance of facts which related to
the commission of the crime.64 As a result of these cases, the California
rules are badly confused. It is difficult to see why the state should
be allowed to introduce evidence in aggravation of the penalty, while
the defendant is denied the right to introduce evidence in mitigation,
on the broad ground that the punishment is not an issue in the trial.
Pennsylvania 5 and several other states have allowed the admission
of evidence relevant solely to the question of punishment.66  It has
long been recognized that evidence admissible upon the issue of guilt
does not furnish sufficient facts upon which to determine the punish-
ment. When the judge has a discretion as to punishment, it is custom-
ary for him to obtain facts in addition to those admitted during the
trial. If one of the reasons for the statute is to separate those cases
wherein capital punishment should be imposed from those wherein it
should not, the desired result is more apt to be obtained by furnishing
the jury with evidence of all the facts relevant to punishment.
Once it has been determined that evidence relevant to punish-
ment should be admitted, two problems arise: (1) what evidence is
so relevant; and (2) what will be its effect upon the jury in regard
57. People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 459, 249 Pac. 859, 861 (1926).
58. 220 Cal. 236, 30 P.2d 404 (1934).
59. Id. at 241, 30 P.2d at 405.
60. Id. at 242, 30 P.2d at 406.
61. People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014 (1939).
62. The defendant's contention was that deceased's insults over a protracted period
of time had given rise to a mental defect. Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa.
134, 160 Atl. 602 (1932).
63. See note 53 supra.
64. People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 776, 87 P.2d 1014, 1042 (1939).
65. Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928) ; Commonwealth
v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 169 Atl. 439 (1933).
66. Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603 (1872); Keirsey v. State, 131 Ark. 487, 199
S.W. 532 (1917); Fletcher v. People, 117 Ill. 184, 7 N.E. 80 (1886); State v.
Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940); Prather v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 327, 170
Pac. 1176 (1918); see State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 837, 28 N.W.2d 475, 484
(1947).
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to the issue of guilt. In determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the question of relevancy is easily answered by saying that
the evidence must have a rational probative value in establishing the
fact in issue.1 However, the determination of punishment is more
than a mere finding of fact. It is a prediction that the ends of society
will best be served by the imposition of a given penalty. Unless such
a prediction is based upon facts, it will be inaccurate; yet, it is difficult
to determine the relationship any given fact bears to the type of punish-
ment that should be inflicted.
In Fields v. State 68 the deceased had cursed, struck and abused
the defendant a few hours before the fatal shooting. The defendant
had attempted to prove that the deceased was of a turbulent, violent
and bloodthirsty nature, but the trial court had held such evidence
inadmissible. In reversing the trial court for failure to admit the
evidence, Chief Justice Peck said that the evidence "was clearly proper
for the consideration of the jury in determining the turpitude of the
crime" 69 in fixing the penalty. The case of Fletcher v. People o in-
volved a motion for a new trial upon the basis of newly discovered
evidence. The evidence tended to show that the defendant had fired
the shot which killed the deceased only after the deceased had struck
the defendant's father with a stick. The Supreme Court of Illinois
held that a new trial should be granted, because the evidence placed
the defendant's conduct "in a moral point of view, less objectionable"
and made the act "less culpable." 71 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Williams72 said that any evidence which the jury
should "in fairness and mercy" consider in determining the "moral
culpability" of the defendant is admissible.7" The proffered evidence
tended to show that the deceased was guilty of acts of perversion against
the defendant and the defendant's sister. After reversing the case
to allow the admission of the aforementioned evidence upon the issue
of the defendant's sanity, the court held that the evidence should not
be considered in determining the punishment because: (1) it tended
only to prove the bad character of the deceased, which fact was not a
mitigating factor; and (2) the killing was, at least in part, motivated
by a desire .for insurance money. 74 Although the terminology of the
67. 1 WimRoa, EviDENcE § 9-12 (3d ed. 1940).
68. 47 Ala. 603 (1872).
69. Id. at 608.
70. 117 Ill. 184, 7 N.E. 80 (1886).
71. Id. at 189, 7 N.E. at 83.
72. 307 Pa. 134, 160 Atl. 602 (1932).
73. Id. at 153, 160 Atl. at 609.
74. That most courts feel that a profit motive should aggravate the penalty, see
note 111 infra.
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above cases varies, the same basic idea is inherent in all of them. The
test as formulated by these courts depends upon the blameworthiness
of the act.
The second problem arising from the admission of evidence rele-
vant solely to punishment is created by the fact that the question of
punishment is determined in the same hearing as is the issue of guilt.
This requires the jurors to hear the evidence as to punishment prior
to the determination of guilt, and might seriously prejudice them upon
the issue of guilt. Since the issue of guilt is fundamental, it is obvious
that evidence which prejudices the jury upon that issue should not
be admitted, regardless of its relevancy to the question of punishment.
Evidence of Other Crimes
Evidence of other crimes has been admitted in aggravation of
punishment."5 In cases wherein the trial judge exercises a discretion
as to punishment, the defendant's record has long been recognized as
one of the guiding factors in the judge's determination of punishment.
However, even though evidence of other crimes is relevant to punish-
ment, it should not be introduced when the jury determines the issue
of guilt and the penalty at the same hearing. Such evidence is a most
striking example of creating prejudice upon the issue of guilt.76
There are three general rules for the introduction of evidence of
other crimes in the traditional criminal trials. (1) Evidence of the
defendant's commission of a separate and distinct crime is not admis-
sible as proof that he committed the crime with which he is presently
charged, except when the evidence has independent relevance, e.g.,
shows intent or plan.77  (2) Evidence of other crimes is not admissible
to show the bad character of the defendant.78  (3) Evidence of other
75. Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
76. Jones, J.: "A jury was supposed to keep separate in its 'adjudicating' mind
the evidence it heard as to the defendant's guilt and, in its 'penalty-fixing' mind, the
evidence as to the defendant's prior unrelated criminal offenses. The thing could,
and no doubt has, actually worked out in practice in a truly shocking way." Com-
monwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 251, 66 A.2d 649, 659 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
"Following the passage of the 1947 amendment to the Act of 1911, I have seen
habitual criminals set free only because the jurors had no knowledge of the defend-
ant's prior criminal record." McClelland, Prior Convictions of a Defendant as
Evidence in a Criminal Trial in Pennsylvania, 22 Tnmip. L.Q. 220 (1949). Mr.
McClelland is the Assistant District Attorney of Erie County, Pennsylvania. The
"1947 amendment" was an act designed to prevent the introduction of evidence of
other crimes solely because of relevancy to punishment. The statement by Mr.
McClelland clearly indicates that the evidence of other crimes was responsible for
the conviction of certain defendants, even though such evidence was inadmissible
upon the issue of guilt. See also 1 WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 194b (3d ed. 1940).
77. 1 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 192 (3d ed. 1940).
78. Ibid. But see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (character
witness for the defendant may be cross-examined as to a previous arrest of defendant
to test qualifications of character witness).
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crimes is admissible to impeach the defendant as a witness.79  If under
the above rules evidence of other crimes were introduced upon the
issue of guilt, assuming such evidence to be relevant to punishment,
there would be no prejudice upon either issue. However, if the evi-
dence could not be admitted under the above rules but was allowed
solely because of relevance to the issue of punishment, the defendant
would be harmed upon the issue of guilt.
Only three states modified these rules to any extent after the jury
was given the additional function of exercising its discretion in regard
to punishment. California " and Oklahoma 81 have held that if the
defendant was serving a life sentence in the penitentiary at the time
of the commission of the murder for which he was on trial, that fact
could be introduced in court. While this may not actually be evidence
of the commission of another crime, it does demonstrate to the jury
that the defendant has previously been convicted, and so may be con-
sidered in the same aspect. The reason for the holding is to prevent
the jury from imposing another life sentence, since the courts feel
that such a sentence would actually constitute no added penalty.
82
There are two possible reservations as to the wisdom of such a rule.
In the first place, it ignores the fact that the issue of guilt is being
determined at the same time. It is possible that the value obtained
by introducing such evidence is negated by the prejudice created in
the jury against the defendant upon the issue of guilt. Secondly, it
seems apparent that a second life sentence would tend to prevent any
consideration of parole, and the defendant might be required to remain
in prison much longer than he otherwise would have. In addition,
he could be deprived of certain privileges and subjected to punishments,
so that the manner of serving his sentence would be changed consider-
ably."
Pennsylvania has gone much further than California and Okla-
homa. In a first degree murder case in Pennsylvania, the prosecution
may introduce evidence of other crimes solely because of its relevance
to punishment.8 Of course, the judge must charge the jury that
79. 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 890 (3d ed. 1940). For a critical comment upon
the use of other crimes to attack credibility, see Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current
Trends, 89 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 166, 174-191 (1940).
80. People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859 (1926) ; cf. State v. Kelley, 118
Ore. 397, 247 Pac. 146 (1926). Contra: Hartfield v. State, 186 Miss. 75, 189 So.
530 (1939).
81. Prather v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 327, 170 Pac. 1176 (1918).
82. People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 459. 249 Pac. 859, 861 (1926) ; Prather v. State,
14 Okla. Cr. 327, 329, 170 Pac. 1176, 1177 (1918) ; see also N.D. Ray. ConE § 12-2713
(1943) and R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 606, § 2 (1938).
83. See SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 374 (1924).
84. Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928).
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such evidence may be considered only when determining punishment,8 5
but it is naive to think that such a charge does not really emphasize
the fact that the defendant already has a criminal record. 6 No other
state has allowed the introduction of evidence of other crimes in aggra-
vation of the penalty, but several have expressly ruled upon the ques-
tion and have held such evidence inadmissible." In some states, the
courts have not been faced with the precise problem but, in ruling upon
evidence in mitigation, have stated that no evidence is admissible unless
it is admissible upon the issue of guilt.8  The Colorado court in Reppin
v. People I" held that evidence of other crimes was not admissible
when the defendant had pleaded guilty and the jury had only to
determine the degree of the crime and the punishment to be imposed.
In a similar situation a Federal Court held evidence of other crimes
admissible, but in dictum said the evidence would bd inadmissible in
a trial wherein the defendant had pleaded not guilty." However, in
State v. Hofer,91 a case which involved the killing of a prison guard
during the perpetration of an escape, the Iowa court, although expressly
refusing to rule upon the point, cited the Pennsylvania authority with
apparent approval.
The traditional rule that evidence of other crimes is not admissible
to prove the crime charged is based upon the fact that such evidence
does not have sufficient probative value.9 2 If the jury is influenced
upon the issue of guilt because of the introduction of such evidence
upon !he question of punishment, this rule is successfully avoided.
The rule that such evidence could not be introduced to show bad
85. Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 160 Atl. 602 (1932).
86. As to the effect of such an instruction: "The more carefully the defense
attorney and the court warn the jury that its purpose is only to test credibility,
the more emphasized the fact becomes that the jury has before them one who has
been convicted of crime before, that he is on trial again, and that it is perhaps
time that something should be done about it." Ladd, szupra note 79, at 190. "Inci-
dentally, the Judge in his charge to the jury must strictly limit the evidence of
prior convictions to aggravation of the penalty and such evidence must not be con-
sidered in determining guilt or innocence. As though the words of a Judge at the
end of a long murder trial would mean very much to a jury !" McClelland, supra
note 76, at 224.
87. Williams v. State, 183 Ark. 870, 39 S.W.2d 295 (1931) ; Fitzgerald v. State,
184 Ga. 19, 190 S.E. 602 (1937) ; Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N.E. 821 (1889) ;
Call v. State, 69 Okla. Cr. 264, 264 Pac. 643 (1928) ; Watson v. State, 123 Tex.
Cr. R. 360, 59 S.W.2d 126 (1933) ; State v. Barton, 198 Wash. 268, 88 P.2d 385
(1939) ; State v. Vines, 49 Wyo. 212, 54 P.2d 826 (1936).
88. Campbell v. Territory, 14 Ariz. 109, 125 Pac. 717 (1902); People v. Witt,
170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915) ; Gardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310, 17 S.E. 86 (1892) ;
State v. Tranmer, 39 Nev. 142, 154 Pac. 80 (1915); State v. Molnar, 133 N.J.L.
327, 44 A.2d 197 (1945) ; Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. 214 (1935).
89. 95 Colo. 192, 34 P.2d 71 (1934).
90. United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1938).
91. 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475 (1947).
92. ". . . where the doing of an act is the proposition to be proved, there can
never be a direct inference from an act of former conduct to the act charged;
there must always be a double step of inference of some sort, a 'tertium quid'. . ..
Human action being infinitely varied, there is no adequate probative connection be-
tween the two." 1 Wimiou, EVIDENCE § 192 (3d ed. 1940).
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character is founded upon the fact that it proves too much with a
resultant prejudice to the rights of the defendant. 3 Since the courts
have felt that an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of the
evidence to the question of the defendant's character is not a sufficient
safeguard for the accused, there is no reason to believe that they would
feel that an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of evidence
of other crimes to the question of punishment would be any more
effective.
The reason for holding evidence of other crimes admissible in
Commonwealth v. Parker was stated by Chief Justice von Moschzisker
in the following language:
"The Act of 1925 was not passed to help habitual criminals,
and we take judicial knowledge of the fact that offenders of that
designation, have become so general that the law, not only lex
scripta but non scripta, must advance to protect society against
them." 0
The date of the case, 1928, is of significance in the light of the
above quotation. The use of the automobile as a rapid means of trans-
portation was just emerging. This development widened the possible
area of activity for the criminal and provided him with an easy means
of escape as well. Another factor not involved in this particular case
was prohibition, which provided a prize lucrative enough in the illicit
liquor market to cause the formation of organized gangs. There can
be little quarrel with the court for taking judicial notice of the in-
creasing number of habitual criminals.
However, there appears to be no justification for the statement
that the Act was not passed to help habitual criminals. Such a state-
ment seems to indicate that all habitual criminals should still be capitally
punished, 5 and apparently assumes that a record of past convictions
is controlling upon the question of punishment, regardless of the effect
of other pertinent facts. There is nothing to indicate that such was
the legislative intent. Neither is there anything to indicate that the
legislature intended the Act to result in convictions of first degree mur-
der on the strength of the defendants' criminal records. Under the
present system in Pennsylvania, evidence of other crimes is used to
convict."6 We have then a situation wherein the defendant, who is
93. "It may almost be said that it is because of this indubitable Relevancy of
such evidence that it is excluded. It is objectionable, not because it has no ap-
preciable probative value, but because it has too much." 1 WGMORE, EViDEN cE
§194 (3d ed. 1940).
94. 294 Pa. 144, 154, 143 Atl. 904, 907 (1928).
95. The word "help" in the quotation must refer to the imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment rather than death since that was the only innovation made by
the Act of 1925. Therefore, the court is actually saying that all habitual criminals
should still be executed.
96. See note 76 rpra.
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entitled to require that the Commonwealth prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, is being convicted upon evidence inadmissible to
prove guilt, merely because the jury has been prejudiced against him.
Since police methods are far from perfect and since juries continue
to acquit defendants upon occasions, it must be assumed that the
possibility of the defendant's being innocent is ever present. The
thought that the accused might be guiltless and yet be convicted and
executed because of a jury's prejudice is so utterly abhorrent to the
Anglo-Saxon philosophy of criminal law that no supposed or real ad-
vantage gained in the determination of punishment could justify such
a practice.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has attempted to place certain
restrictions upon the introduction of evidence of other crimes. The
first deals with the type of case in which such evidence may be intro-
duced. It is allowable only when the defendant is a "professional
criminal" engaged in a crime for profit, or when the crime is of an
atrocious nature. 7 The second defines the form of the evidence,
which must be either a criminal record of convictions but not a record
of a mere arrest,98 or an admission by the defendant. 9  The third
allows only evidence of past crimes which were of a violent nature.' 0
While there may be some argument as to the validity of these limita-
tions, it must be conceded that any restriction upon the introduction
of such evidence is desirable, since the rule in such instances should
have been one of absolute exclusion.
The Illinois and Nevada courts have established different rules
upon the question of whether the admission of evidence of other crimes
must in all cases be considered as prejudicial error, unless such ad-
97. Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 152, 160 Atl. 602, 608 (1932).
In regard to the requirement that the defendant be a "professional criminal," it
was held in Commonwealth v. Brooks, 355 Pa. 551, 50 A.2d 325 (1947) that evi-
dence of the defendant's record was admissible when the defendant had been con-
victed of only one other crime. Therefore, the requirement seems illusory.
Another problem which apparently remains unanswered is what makes a murder
atrocious. It would seem that all first degree murder is atrocious by nature. For
a case wherein the court has said that the murder was atrocious, see Common-
wealth v. Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 154 Atl. 483 (1931) and its companion case,
Commonwealth v. Nafus, 303 Pa. 418, 154 Atl. 485 (1931).
98. Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 594, 50 A.2d 342 (1947).
99. Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928) (confession
of defendant may be used as evidence of other crimes) ; Commonwealth v. Kurutz,
312 Pa. 342, 168 Atl. 28 (1933) (defendant may be cross-examined to show evidence
of other crimes).
100. Kephart, J.: "But in no case should a record of . . . criminal acts such
as pickpocketry, adultery, embezzling, perjury, or others of a similar nature be used
in aggravation of the penalty." Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 152, 160
Atl. 602, 608 (1932). See Commonwealth v. Clark, 322 Pa. 321, 185 Atl. 764
(1936) (admission of evidence of prior conviction of drunkenness held to be re-
versible error). See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 314 Pa. 81, 171 Atl. 279 (1934)
(when defendant has a record of two past convictions only one of which is ad-
missible, the entire record is admissible).
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missions can be justified under the rules established for the trial of
guilt. The Illinois court has held the admission of such evidence to
be reversible error, because it may have prejudiced the jury upon the
question of punishment even though it did not do so upon the issue
of guilt.'' Since evidence of other crimes is relevant to punishment,
this holding is hard to justify. In People v. Popescue 102 the Illinois
court held that when the judge determines the punishment upon a
plea of guilty, he may consider the defendant's criminal record. In
dictum, the court has said that the reason such evidence is inadmis-
sible when the jury is determining both guilt and punishment is be-
cause of prejudice upon the issue of guilt. This case represents a
clearer evaluation of the problem and would appear to undermine the
reasoning of the darlier Illinois cases. Nevada has held that although
the admission of evidence of other crimes is error, it is not in all
cases prejudicial.3 The approach adopted by this court has been to
examine the evidence of each case to determine whether the jury
could have found the defendant innocent had the evidence of other
crimes not been admitted.' 4 If it is determined that the error was
not prejudicial as to guilt, the case is not reversible. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to evaluate the tests employed by the various
courts in determining whether error in the trial of guilt is prejudicial.
Whether or not the Nevada test is good, the rule requiring the evi-
dence of other crimes to be prejudicial as to guilt before a case may
be reversed is far superior to the rulings of the Illinois cases.
Evidence in Mitigation of Punishment
Evidence of environment, 0 5 motive,' mental defect, 0 7 and
provocation 108 has been admitted in mitigation of punishment. In
101. Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N.E. 821 (1889); People v. King, 276
Ill. 138, 114 N.E. 601 (1916); People v. Heffernan, 312 Il1. 66, 143 N.E. 411
(1924); People v. Mangano, 375 Ill. 72, 30 N.E.2d 428 (1940).
102. 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739 (1931).
103. State v. Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P.2d 703 (1945).
104. Ducker, J.: "Hence, in the presence of such enormous and clearly proven
guilt we will not pause to speculate as to whether, if evidence of other offenses had
been omitted the jury might have returned a verdict carrying a lesser penalty."
Id. at 66, 161 P.2d at 711 (1945).
105. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1941). Contra: State v. Barth,
114 N.J.L. 112, 176 Atl. 183 (1935).
106. Nowacryk v. People, 139 Ill. 336, 28 N.E. 961 (1891). See also State v.
Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 837, 28 N.W.2d 474, 478 (1947).
107. Commonwealth v. Stabinsky. 313 Pa. 231, 169 Atl. 439 (1933). See also
Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148, 115 N.W. 850 (1908) (evidence that defendant
suffered from mental disease led court to reduce punishment to life imprisonment);
Swartz v. State, 118 Neb. 591, 225 N.W. 766 (1929) (punishment reduced because
defendant was a drug addict). Contra: Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197
N.E. 214 (1935) ; State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858 (1927).
108. Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603 (1872) ; Keirsey v. State, 131 Ark. 487, 199
S.W. 532 (1917) ; Fletcher v. People, 177 Ill. 184, 7 N.E. 80 (1886). See also
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addition, courts have indicated that the age of the defendant -o9 or
his having been intoxicated at the time of the commission of the
crime ... might also be considered by the jury.
All of the above evidence is obviously relevant if the courts' test
of relevance is adopted, i.e., those things which the jury in "fairness
and mercy" should consider in determining the "moral culpability"
of the defendant-and none of it would appear to have the effect of
prejudicing the state's case upon the issue of guilt. Therefore, the
courts would be justified in admitting such evidence purely because
of its relevance to punishment."'
Another type of evidence which the defendant should be allowed
to introduce is proof that although he took part in the felony, he did
not commit the act which caused the death."' To punish such a de-
fendant capitally is to inflict the supreme penalty for the creation of
a dangerous situation, and there is an inherent difference in culpability
between creating a dangerous situation and performing an act which
must reasonably result in death. However, such evidence should not
be admissible in all cases. Suppose A and B arm themselves and go
to rob a bank. Upon encountering resistance, A turns and flees
without firing a shot, but B shoots and kills C. Then, assume the
Anthony v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 494, 159 Pac. 934 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Gar-
ramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 AtI. 733 (1932) (sentences reduced because of provoca-
tion).
109. See Ridge v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 150, 229 Pac. 649 (1924) ; von Moschzisker,
Capital Punishment in the Pennsylvania Court, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 174, 187 (1949).
110. Harris v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 542, 209 S.W. 509 (1919). See also
Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285 (1930); Commonwealth v. Esposito,
24 Luz. L.R. 517 (Pa. 1927); cf. Triplett v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 714, 114
S.W.2d 1108 (1938).
111. It should be noted that evidence of motive may be considered in aggravation
of punishment, as well as in mitigation thereof. "Factors bearing on the moral
responsibility of the defendant are almost the only matters considered in murder
cases. The chief circumstance of aggravation is found where the killing was de-
liberately planned, for a sordid or monetary motive, without provocation by the
victim. In the opinion of the courts, there can be no more aggravated killing."
Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sente)xes on Appeal I, 37 Cot. L. REv. 521, 531
(1937). See also Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 308 Pa. 134, 160 Atl. 602 (1932).
112. See Commonwealth v. Zietz, 364 Pa. 294, 298, 72 A.2d 282, 284 (1950)
wherein Stern, J., in discussing why Capone, an accomplice of defendant's, was
sentenced to life imprisonment while defendant was sentenced to death, said:
". .. moreover, not only did Zeitz take a leading and aggressive part in the holdup
whereas Capone remained outside in the automobile, but it was Zietz who actually
committed the murder for which all of those engaged in the affair were indicted
and convicted." Other reasons advanced were that Capone was only sixteen years
of age and mentally retarded. If the felony-murder rule is to be extended to make
the accomplices guilty of murder when the person resisting the felony actually does
the killing, such fact should be considered by the jury. That the rule has been
extended that far, see Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
Contra: Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905). See also
State v. Meadows, 330 Mo. 1020, 51 S.W.2d 1033 (1932) (affirming refusal by
lower court to charge that jury should consider fact that defendant had not
lighted fire which caused victim's death).
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same set of facts except that both A and B fire at C, but A fires
wildly. In the first hypothetical both A and B are "morally"
blameworthy for the creation of a dangerous -situation, but B alone
is blameworthy for C's death. In the second, both are equally blame-
worthy, and the result should not turn upon marksmanship. To
allow the introduction of such evidence would not do violence to the
rule that a conspirator is liable for the acts of his confederates in the
prosecution of the conspiracy. Both would still be guilty of the same
crime, with only the punishments differing.
Counsel's Right to Argue Punishment
There is agreement upon the fundamental proposition that the
counsel may argue the question of punishment," 3 and on this point
the courts have had little difficulty in spite of the fact that some of
them have held that punishment is not an issue in the trial. It must
be recognized that since the questions of guilt and punishment are
decided at the same hearing in all states, such a rule places the counsel
for the defendant in anomalous position. Whereas the prosecuting
attorney's argument for the death penalty is the natural culmination of
his case, the defense attorney must first argue that the defendant is not
guilty, and then that even if he is guilty, he should not be capitally
punished. Such an inconsistency could be very damaging to the de-
fendant insofar as the issue of guilt is concerned. The defendant's
counsel must then decide whether to ignore the issue of punishment,
and avoid this danger, or to argue the issue and incur the danger.
The courts apparently have not considered this discrepancy in for-
mulating the rule that counsel may argue the question of punishment.
It is probable that such a rule is desirable, although the above difficulty
cannot be remedied unless a system is established which allows a
separate hearing upon the question of punishment.
Since the statute permitting jury determination of the sentence
is predicated upon the proposition that some but not all murderers
should be capitally punished, the jury has a duty to evaluate the facts
or the circumstances of each case in order to determine into which
category it should fall. Counsel may not, therefore, appeal to the
jury's prejudices," 4 nor condemn the use of capital punishment in all
113. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 309 Pa. 515, 164 Atl. 726 (1933) ; Burgunder
v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940); House v. State, 192 Ark. 476, 92
S.W.2d 868 (1936); People v. Goodwin, 9 Cal.2d 711, 72 P.2d 551 (1937); Biggers
v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S.E. 201 (1930); Howell v. State, 102 Ohio St. 411, 131
N.E. 706 (1921); Arcos v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. R. 315, 29 S.W.2d 395 (1930);
State v. Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1939) ; State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va.
1, 20 S.E. 873 (1894).
114. People v. Riley, 208 Cal. 385, 281 Pac. 606 (1929); State v. Blackman,
108 La. 121, 32 So. 334 (1902).
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cases,1" 5 nor call the statute a farce,"" because such arguments tend
to discourage the jury from carrying out their duty and thereby tend
to negate the policy of the statute. On the other hand, any argument
that is drawn as a logical inference from the facts in evidence aids the
jury in evaluating the punishment to be inflicted and should be allowed.
An argument by the prosecuting attorney to the effect that if
the defendant is given life imprisonment he may be paroled and return
to endanger society again is a fertile source of appeals. The courts
have indicated that they do not consider such an argument prejudicial,
although they do regard it as improper."' Whether it is prejudicial
or not may depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. For
instance, the argument was held to be reversible error in the case of
Berry v. Commonwealth, 8 because it was shown in evidence that the
defendant had twice before been committed to a mental institution only
to be released in a short time to continue his criminal activity. The
argument appears to be improper because the parole laws do not destroy
the power of the state to keep the defendant in prison until he dies if
the jury imposes life imprisonment. The fact that a person sentenced
for life might be released before he may safely be returned to society
indicates a weakness in the parole system-not that he ought to have
been executed. If the jurors impose capital punishment because of
the fear that the defendant may be paroled at some future time, they
are, in effect, predicting that when the question of his parole arises
several years hence, he will be unworthy of it but will be paroled
nonetheless. No man should be sentenced to death upon such a
prophecy. To allow this argument in any case should be prejudicial
error. It is difficult to imagine any contention the prosecuting attorney
could make which would have as great a tendency to lead the jury
to impose the death penalty. The test as to the prejudicial character
of the error applied in People v. Ramirez was whether or not the
appellate court could say that the result would have been different
but for the error. Regardless of the validity of such a test upon the
issue of guilt, it should not be used when a discretion is involved. By
115. Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 45 A.2d 43 (1946); State v. Gar-
rington, 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).
116. State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922) ; State v. Henry, 196 La.
217, 198 So. 910 (1940) ; State v. Tiedt, 357 Mo. 115, 206 S.W.2d 524 (1947).
117. People v. Riley, 208 Cal. 385, 281 Pac. 606 (1929); Bryan v. State, 206
Ga. 73, 55 S.E.2d 574 (1949) ; McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S.E.2d 294 (1949) ;
State v. Junkins, 147 Iowa 588, 126 N.W. 689 (1910) ; Lee v. Commonwealth, 262
Ky. 15, 89 S.W.2d 316 (1936) ; Jacobs v. State, 103 Miss. 622, 60 So. 723 (1913) ;
Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 551, 21 A.2d 38, 41 (1941) ; cf. McNeill v.
State, 102 Ala. 121, 15 So. 352 (1894) ; Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P.2d 312
(1936); People v. Sampsell, 34 Cal.2d 757, 214 P.2d 813 (1950); Pena v. State,
137 Tex. Cr. RM 311, 129 S.W.2d 667 (1939); State v. Stratton, 170 Wash. 666,
17 P.2d 621 (1932).
118. 227 Ky. 528, 13 S.W.2d 521 (1929).
119. 1 CaI.2d 559, 36 P.2d 628 (1934).
19531
1120 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
its nature a discretion embodies to some extent the character and
attitude of the person or the group exercising it. Consequently, it
would be virtually impossible to determine the exact basis for the
punishment imposed, and the test could never be adequately met. If
this argument for capital punishment is made, the prejudicial effect
of the error would not be negated by an instruction by the judge that
the jury must not consider the effect of the parole laws. Courts have
been admonishing prosecuting attorneys for years of the -impropriety of
the argument, but it continues to be made. The only way to solve this
problem is to require a new trial if the parole laws are discussed in
such a manner by a prosecutor.
Instructions Upon Punishment
It is well settled that the judge must instruct the jury that it may
determine which of the prescribed punishments is to be imposed, and
failure to so instruct is reversible error. 2 ' Such a rule is essential
to the effective operation of the statute. Kansas has gone even further
and has ruled that failure to inform the jury of its power in relation to
punishment constitutes reversible error, even when the defense attorney,
the prosecuting attorney, and the judge have agreed that if the jury
should find the defendant guilty, the punishment shall be life im-
prisonment.' It seems unnecessary under such circumstances to re-
quire that the case be reversed and remanded for a retrial. The defend-
ant cannot complain of the error because he is receiving the lowest
sentence possible under the Kansas statute for first degree murder,
and the actions of the judge and the prosecuting attorney in agreeing
to life imprisonment should constitute a waiver of the state's statutory
right to have the jury impose the death penalty if it so desires.
There is a split of authority upon the problem of whether the
judge may instruct the jury that it must consider the evidence in
determining the punishment. 2 The question arises in those states
wherein evidence is admissible only if it is relevant to the issue of guilt,
120. Smith v. State, 205 Ark. 1075, 172 S.W.2d 248 (1943) ; State v. Wilson,
157 Iowa 698, 141 N.W. 337 (1913) ; State v. Christensen, 166 Kan. 152, 199 P.2d
475 (1948); Vickers v. United States, 1 Okla. Cr. 452, 98 Pac. 467 (1908); Com-
monwealth v. Madaffer, 291 Pa. 270, 139 Atl. 875 (1927); Marshall v. State, 33
Tex. 664 (1871) ; State v. Yamashita, 61 Utah 170, 211 Pac. 360 (1922) ; Calton v.
Utah, 130 U.S. 83 (1889); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 391, 4 S.E.2d
752 (1939) ; State v. Chaney, 117 W. Va. 605, 186 .E. 607 (1936).
121. State v. Christensen, 166 Kan. 152, 199 P.2d 475 (1948). That such a pro-
cedure does not constitute double jeopardy, see: Application of Christensen, 166
Kan. 671, 203 P.2d 258 (1949).
122. That determination of punishment should be based upon evidence: Sukle v.
People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941); State v. Galvano, 4 W. W. Harr. 409,
154 Atl. 461 (Del. 0. & T. 1930); State v. Meadows, 330 Mo. 1020, 51 S.W.2d
1033 (1932); State v. Jefferson, 131 N.J.L. 70, 34 A.2d 881 (1943); State v.
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as well as in those wherein it is admissible if it is relevant solely to
punishment. The reason for this is that much of the evidence upon
the issue of guilt should be considered in establishing the punishment.
Since many courts hold that the punishment the jury has established
may not be reviewed, the jury can ignore the evidence and determine
the penalty as it sees fit without fear of having it changed. However,
in many respects this is analogous to the question of whether the
juries were judges of the law because of their power to render general
verdicts. The majority of the courts have decided that the jury has
the duty to obtain the law from the judge, even if it has the power
to override that law when the defendant is acquitted." Similarly,
if the rule were that the jury should consider the evidence in deter-
mining the punishment, they would have the duty to do so, despite
the inherent power to disregard it. As a practical matter, it must be
realized that an instruction by the court requiring the determination
of punishment to be based upon the evidence would at least bring it to
the attention of the jurors and thus be effective to some degree in
preventing them from ignoring their duty.
In New Jersey the court in State v. Martin 124 held that the jury
need not consider the evidence in determining the punishment. The
reasoning of the case was based upon the fact that the statute did not
make the recommendation a part of the verdict, thereby giving the
jury an absolute discretion regardless of the facts of the case. It was
immediately discarded when the legislature of that state amended the
statute to read: "Every person convicted of murder in the first degree
. shall suffer death unless the jury shall by its verdict, and as
a part thereof, upon and after the consideration of all the evidence,
recommend. ,, 125 The only other state statute which is helpful
in determining this question is Tennessee's, wherein the law requires
the jury to find mitigating circumstances before allowing the punish-
ment to be reduced to life imprisonment. 2 Obviously, the circum-
Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949) ; People v. Ertel, 283 N.Y. 519, 29 N.E.2d
70 (1940); Howell v. State, 102 Ohio St. 411, 131 N.E. 706 (1921); State v.
Kelley, 118 Ore. 397, 247 Pac. 146 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Childers, 346 Pa. 258,
27 A.2d 35 (1943) ; Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S.W.2d 843 (1932). That
determination need not be based upon evidence: Hill v. State, 72 Ga. 131 (1883);
State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940) ; State v. McMillan, 233 N.C. 630,
65 S.E.2d 212 (1951) ; State v. Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 AtI. 385 (1919) ; State
v. Jones, 201 S.C. 403, 23 S.E.2d 387 (1943); State v. Markham, 100 Utah 226,
112 P.2d 496 (1941); cf. Reece v. State, 208 Ga. 165, 66 S.E.2d 133 (1951).
123. E.g., Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, 86 (1891) (concurring
opinion) ; United States v. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240 (U.S.C.C. Mass. 1835); State v.
Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849).
124. 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 Atl. 385 (1919).
125. N.J. STAT. AN. § 2A:113-4 (1953) (Italics added).
126. ". . . or the jury may, if they are of the opinion that there are mitigating
circumstances. . . ." TENx. CoDE ANx. § 10772 (Williams 1934).
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stances could be found only in the evidence, so it must be considered
if the jury is to perform its function adequately." 7
Thus, the judge should be required to instruct the jury that it
must consider the evidence in deciding the punishment. If the statute
is to achieve its purpose of separating those murderers who should be
sentenced to life imprisonment from those who should be sentenced
to death, it is essential that the jury evaluate the evidence of the case.
The fact that the jury exercises a discretion in determining the punish-
ment should not prevent this instruction. When the judge exercises
a discretion upon the question of punishment, he must consider the
evidence, and there is no reason why the jurors' discretionary power
should be treated any differently. To allow them to arrive at their
decision arbitrarily creates a danger of the defendant being capitally
punished even though the facts of his case would seem to require only
life imprisonment.
In California, which has a statute providing for alternative penal-
ties,128 an instruction requiring the jury to find mitigating circum-
stances before life imprisonment may be considered justifiable has
been approved.129  Such an instruction is obviously against the literal
meaning of the statute, but it was reached by the following reasoning:
murder was punishable by death prior to the enactment of the statute;
after the enactment of the statute, the policy of the state continued to
be that murderers should be executed; and therefore, murderers should
be capitally punished unless mitigating factors can be found.,30 The
defect in such reasoning is the court's assumption that the statute does
not alter the policy of the state. Such an instruction places an undue
burden upon the defendant; 1' and it is doubly unjust inasmuch as
California allows the introduction of only that evidence which pertains
to the issue of guilt.132 The result is that the defendant is required
to show mitigating circumstances and then is denied the right to do so.
This has led to a strong attack upon the validity of the instruction, 
3
but it is still not regarded as reversible error.
127. Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S.W.2d 843 (1932).
128. "Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or
confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the jury..." CAL.
PEN. CoDE § 190 (Deering 1941).
129. People v. Brick, 68 Cal. 190, 8 Pac. 858 (1885) ; People v. Kolez, 23 Cal.2d
670, 145 P.2d 580 (1944) ; People v. Williams, 32 Cal.2d 78, 195 P.2d 393 (1948) ;
cf. People v. Bollinger, 196 Cal. 191, 237 Pac. 25 (1925). See also State v. Skaug,
63 Nev. 59, 72, 161 P.2d 708, 713 (1945) and cases cited therein for the reason
Nevada adopted the California rule.
130. People v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174, 179-180 (1874).
131. See People v. Williams, 32 Cal.2d 78, 89, 195 P.2d 393, 399 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion).
132. People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915).
133. Traynor, J.: "For over fifty years precedents have accumulated condemning
such instructions, even though the court has fallen short of reversing judgments be-
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Pennsylvania has allowed the judge the right to comment upon
the evidence concerning punishment.' His comment has not been
limited to pointing out the various facts relevant to punishment, but
may contain an appraisal of the weight of the evidence as well.3 5
Such comment is not compulsory, even if requested by counsel, but
if the judge discusses any evidence, he must discuss all evidence upon
which comment has been requested by counsel.3
The trial judge should be allowed to bring to the jury's attention
the facts pertinent to an intelligent determination of punishment. Such
comment is necessary to aid the jury in reaching a just decision, and
will lead to a greater standardization of treatment of substantially
similar defendants, and eventually develop a body of case law to act
as a guide in the future. However, there is a danger apparent in al-
lowing the judge to comment upon the evidence concerning punish-
ment. He may abuse his power, and the appellate court will constantly
be required to decide whether or not the trial judge has gone beyond
the realm of permissible comment. The danger is inherent in the
same question when applied to the trial of guilt. The difference is
only one *of degree, i.e., what is permissible comment when the jury
is making a finding of fact may be an abuse of power when the jury
is exercising a discretion, and this difference of degree might well
increase the number of appeals. However, this does not necessitate
a rule prohibiting any comment.
Assuming then that judges' comment is desirable, we take up
the second question: Should his comment be limited merely to point-
ing out relevant considerations? To utilize to the fullest his experience
in such matters, the trial judge should be allowed to comment upon
how much weight should be given the various factors in reaching the
sentence. In this respect, it would be wise to differentiate between
the situation wherein the existence or non-existence of a fact has been
the subject of conflicting evidence, and that wherein the existence
of the fact is not controverted and the sole question is its significance
in the light of the other circumstances. In the first instance, the pro-
cedure involved is essentially the same as that in any other finding of
cause of them." People v. Kolez, 23 Cal.2d 670, 674, 145 P.2d 580, 582 (1944)
(dissenting opinion).
134. Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 45 A.2d 43 (1946); Commonwealth
v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947).
135. Commonwealth v. Sykes, supra note 134.
136. Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 329 (1947). "It may
be difficult to draw a distinct line between those murderers who do, and those who
do not, merit the death penalty. But this need not mean that there is no line, and
it does not mean that trial judges cannot adequately instruct juries as to the factors
to be considered in fixing the penalty. Yet, Comnwnwealth v. Wooding throws a
protective mantle over the refusal of any judge so to charge." von Moschzisker,
Caital Puntishonet in the Pennsylvania Courts, 20 PA. B.A.Q. 174, 188 (1949).
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fact. However, when the evidence is not controverted or when the
jury has established the facts, these facts can have no plausible
significance unless they are viewed in the light of the goal to be achieved
and the means through which this achievement may be hoped for.
Members of the jury cannot be expected to be aware of these various
theories of criminal law, and so if they are to perform their function
adequately they must be advised of the significance of the many factors.
The Pennsylvania court's solution, i.e., that the judge shall have the
right but not the duty to comment, is regrettable. Once it is estab-
lished that the jury's need of assistance requires the judge to aid
them, there is no reason for allowing him to avoid his responsibility1'
7
In addition to permitting comment upon the evidence, Pennsyl-
vania allows the judge to express an opinion upon the punishment
to be inflicted." The rule is based upon the reasoning that the jury
may accept or reject the opinion. 9 In view of the judge's position
in the jurors' eyes and the total unpreparedness of the average jurors
to solve the problem of punishment, the great likelihood is that they
will accept it. 4 ' To allow the judge to express his opinion is to dis-
courage the jury from making an independent determination of the
punishment in the light of the facts, but to allow the judge to comment
upon the evidence is to aid the jury in evaluating these facts.
The problem of whether or not the trial judge should instruct
regarding the possibility of parole has not been uniformly handled by
the courts. Some say that although such a charge constitutes error,
the error is not reversible.' 4' It also has been held that to refuse to
make such a charge was not error.'42 On the other hand, the New
137. "There either is or is not a rational way to approach the problem of
whether a man should live or die. If there is such a way, a vigilant judiciary
can define it and do much to assure that it is followed. If there is no rational basis
for deciding between life and death, would not the latter penalty be better abandoned
than imposed capriciously?" von Moschzisker, supra note 136, at 188.
138. Commonwealth v. Nafus, 303 Pa. 418, 154 Atl. 485 (1931); Common-
wealth v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 169 Atl. 439 (1933) ; Commonwealth v. Edwards,
318 Pa. 1, 178 Atl. 20 (1935).
139. Commonwealth v. Nafus, 303 Pa. 418, 420-421, 145 Atl. 485-486 (1931).
140. McCulloch, J.: "Jurors are generally alert to catch the slightest intima-
tion from the Court . . . and he should exercise the utmost care and circumspec-
tion not to say anything to the jury which might be understood as an intimation
of the court's opinion upon the facts of the case." Pittman v. Arkansas, 84 Ark.
292, 296, 105 S.W. 874, 876 (1907) (dissenting opinion).
141. People v. Sukdol, 322 Ill. 540, 153 N.E. 727 (1926); Postell v. Common-
wealth, 174 Ky. 272, 192 S.W. 39 (1917) ; State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542
(1937) ; cf. Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941) (prejudicial error
even though instruction was requested by the jury).
142. State v. Dooley, 89 Iowa 584, 57 N.W. 414 (1894); State v. Lammers,
171 Kan. 668, 237 P.2d 410 (1951); Gaines v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 237, 46
S.W.2d 75 (1932). See Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951)
(defendant not entitled to instruction that jury could, by its verdict, forbid parole).
See also State v. Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 95 N.E.2d 385 (1950).
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Jersey court apparently approves of such an instruction.143  Due to
the judge's position, an instruction would be more damaging than in-
formation by the counsel, so if argument of counsel upon this point is
considered prejudicial error, obviously an instruction by the judge
should be considered reversible error.
144
THE DUTY OF THE JURY TO DETERMINE PUNISHMENT, AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF UNANIMITY
The thirty-six ' statutes with which we have been primarily
concerned all provide that the jury's determination of punishment is
binding upon the court. We have yet to discover whether or not
the jury's power constitutes a mere right to establish the penalty or a
duty to do so. This problem is complicated by the wording of some of
the statutes which give significance to the jury's silence upon the
question of punishment.146  For instance, if the statute provides for
life imprisonment unless the jury changes the penalty to death,1 47 the
jury's silence automatically would impose life imprisonment. Under
statutes of this type, the only time the court can be sure that the
jurors are not imposing the punishment is when they specifically state
in their verdict that they disagree as to the penalty. On the other
hand, when they may choose between alternate punishments, their
silence gives rise to the problem here being discussed.
Two states which provide for alternative penalties have special
statutes which deal with the question of the jury's determination of
punishment. Both the Montana 148 and the Missouri 149 statutes pro-
vide that when the jurors fail to agree upon the punishment or when
they fail to assess it in the verdict, the court may establish it. In
Missouri this has been held to mean that the judge may poll the
jurors as to their opinions concerning the proper punishment and in-
flict the death penalty if the majority favor it. 50 Presumably, under
143. State v. Mosely, 102 N.J.L. 94, 121 Atl. 292 (1925). Some states place
great weight upon whether the instruction is voluntary or has been requested by the
jury. See Freeman v. State, 156 Ark. 592, 247 S.W. 51 (1923) and notes 141, 142,
supra.
144. Stern, J.: "If the thought when thus conveyed to the jury by the district
attorney was 'improper and is out of place' it would certainly be all the more ob-
jectionable when conveyed to the jury by the trial judge even though by way of a
response to their express inquiry." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 147, 81
A.2d 569, 573 (1951).
145. See note 6 supra.
146. See notes 15 and 16 supra.
147. N.H. REv. LAws c. 455, §4 (1942); WASH. REV. CoDE §9.48.030 (1951).
148. MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 94, c. 74, § 94-7412 (1947).
149. Mo. Rav. STAT. c. 37 § 546.440 (1949).
150. State v. Jackson, 340 Mo. 748, 102 S.W.2d 612 (1937).
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this statute such a procedure is not required. 5' In Idaho, because of
the permissive wording of its statute, i.e., "may decide," 152 the judge
may establish the punishment if the jury does not.'5"
Nevada's statute, which is copied after California's,' 5" reads as
follows: "Every person convicted of murder in the first degree shall
suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion
of the jury trying the same; or upon a plea of guilty the court shall
determine the same. . " 155 Both states 1 allow an instruction to
the effect that if the jury is silent as to punishment in its verdict, the
trial judge must impose death. However, if the jury informs the court
that it has been unable to agree upon the punishment, for the trial judge
to impose the death penalty is error in California, 157 but not in
Nevada.'
In the California case of People v. Hall,' Shenk, J., said:
"If he be found guilty of murder in the first degree, it is then
incumbent on the jury to fix the penalty.
"Under the law the verdict in such a case must be the result
of the unanimous agreement of the jurors and the verdict is in-
complete unless, as returned, it embraces the two necessary con-
stituent elements.. ,, 160
The California interpretation shown above represents the plain
meaning of the statute. 161 The Nevada interpretation deprives the
151. "Where the jury agree upon a verdict of guilty but fail to agree upon the
punishment to be inflicted or do not declare such punishment by their verdict; the
court shall assess and declare the punishment and render judgment accordingly."
Mo. R v. STAT. c. 37 § 546.440 (1949). There is obviously no requirement that the
judge assess the punishment in accordance with the majority of the jurors' desires
in this section.
152. IDAHo CoDE, § 18-4004 (1948).
153. State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 633, 203 Pac. 279, 282 (1921).
154. Taber, C.J. "The provision . . . has been the subject of much controversy,
not only in this state, but in the State of California from whose penal code the
provision was adopted by the Legislature of Nevada." Kramer v. State, 60 Nev.
262, 273, 108 P.2d 304, 309 (1940).
155. N v. Comp. LAWS § 10068 (1929). The statute has been amended to read:
"If the jury shall find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, then the
jury by its verdict shall fix the penalty at death or imprisonment in the state prison
for life." Nev. Stat. c. 91, § 121 (1947). The use of the words "shall fix" indicates
that the rule of State v. Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P.2d 708 (1945) may no longer
be applicable.
156. People v. French, 69 Cal. 169, 10 Pac. 378 (1886) ; People v. Adams, 199
Cal. 361, 249 Pac. 186 (1926); People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859 (1926);
State v. Russell, 47 Nev. 263, 220 Pac. 552 (1923) ; Kramer v. State, 60 Nev. 262, 108
P.2d 304 (1940); State v. Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P.2d 708 (1945).
157. People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859 (1926).
158. State v. Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P.2d 708 (1945). See note 155 stpra.
159. 199 Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859 (1926).
160. Id. at 456, 249 Pac. at 860.
161. "One who contends that a section of an act must not be read literally
must show either that some other section of the act expands or restricts its meaning,
that the section itself is repugnant to the general purview of the act . . . or with
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defendant of an important right which the legislature intended to give.
Obviously, neither state is justified under the statute in impos-
ing the death penalty when the jury is silent as to punishment, and
allowing the imposition of the death penalty when the jury is in dis-
agreement upon the punishment is to amplify the error. In the remain-
ing states whose statutes provide alternative penalties, the courts which
have ruled upon the question have held that to accept a verdict which
does not specify the punishment constitutes error.
162
It is clear that no problem can arise in those states wherein the
statutes impose a specified punishment unless changed by the jury, so
long as the jurors are unanimous in their agreement to remain silent
or to change the punishment. However, when they affirmatively indi-
cate that there is disagreement as to punishment, 163 or when the judge
instructs them as to the effect of disagreement, 14 an interesting prob-
lem of statutory interpretation develops. Does this type of statute first
require a determination of guilt, and then automatic infliction of the
prescribed punishment unless all the jurors agree to change it?
Four states have statutes which are controlling upon this point.
The Florida statute provides that a recommendation of mercy by the
majority of the jury requires the court to impose a life sentence."
The Mississippi statute provides that mere disagreement (1 to 11)
among the jurors- regarding punishment requires the imposition of a
life sentence. 60 It is interesting to note that the Mississippi statute
was enacted after the Mississippi court had adopted the view that the
judge must automatically impose the death sentence unless all twelve
jurors agreed to change the punishment.167  In Missouri and Montana
the legislative history of the subject matter, imports a different meaning. If the
language is plain, unambiguous and uncontrolled by other parts of the act or other
acts upon the same subject the court cannot give it a different meaning." 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUcrIoN § 4702, pp. 335, 336 (3d ed. 1943).
162. Smith v. State, 23 Ala. App. 72, 121 So. 692 (1929) ; Lowery v. Howard,
103 Ind. 440, 3 N.E. 124 (1885); State v. Christensen, 166 Kan. 152, 199 P.2d 475
(1948); Davis v. State, 51 Okla. Cr. 386, 1 P.2d 824 (1931); Mays v. State, 143
Tenn. 443, 226 S.W. 233 (1920) ; In re Voight, 130 Wash. 140, 226 Pac. 482 (1924).
See also Commonwealth v. Curry, 287 Pa. 553, 558, 135 Atl. 316, 317 (1926) (jury
has duty to determine punishment).
163. See People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249 Pac. 859 (1926); State v. Skaug,
63 Nev. 59, 161 P.2d 708 (1945). As previously pointed out, allowable instructions
in these states virtually changed their type of statute to that of one giving significance
to the jury's silence.
164. See Smith v. United States, 47 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1931) ; People v. Hicks,
287 N.Y. 165, 38 N.E.2d 482 (1941) ; Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1947) ;
cf. Parker v. State, 24 Wyo. 491, 161 Pac. 552 (1916); Cirej v. State, 24 Wyo.
507, 161 Pac. 556 (1916) (instruction that court could exercise discretion if jury
did not hold error).
165. FLA. STAT. c. 919, § 919.23(2) (1951).
166. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2217 (1942).
167. Green v. State, 55 Miss. 454 (1877) ; Fleming v. State, 60 Miss. 434 (1882).
1953]
1128 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
disagreement of one juror regarding the punishment would make its
determination the responsibility of the judge.'
Counsel for the United States in Andres v. United States0 0
contended that the defendant should be sentenced to death unless all
twelve jurors agreed to change the punishment.170  However, the
United States Supreme Court held that it was error to instruct the
jury that if they could not agree upon the punishment, the verdict of
guilty must stand unqualified. 17 ' The basis of the holding was that
the determination of punishment, even though it may have been mani-
fested by the silence of the jury, is a part of the verdict and hence, must
be unanimous . 2  This view is adequately sustained by the statute
which expressly states that "the jury may qualify their verdict by
adding thereto 'without capital punishment.' "17 The statutes of
Wyoming 17' and Louisiana 171 use similar terms. Statutes of seven
other states also indicate that the jury's determination is a part of the
verdict.1'7  That the Court in the Andres case felt that the jury must
determine the penalty is evidenced by the fact that they said an instruc-
tion requiring unanimity upon both guilt and punishment would be
proper. In states where the statute provides alternate punishments,
the determination is part of the verdict and must be unanimous also,
so actually results under both types of statutes are identical.
Right of Appeal from Jury's Determination of Punishment
A great number of courts hold that the jury's determination of
punishment cannot be reviewed when the only error claimed is the
jury's abuse of discretion. 7 7  The Iowa Supreme Court has even said
168. See notes 160, 161 supra.
169. 333 U.S. 740 (1947).
170. Id. at 746.
171. Id. at 748-749. Cantra.: State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249 (1950).
172. Reed, J.: ". . . In criminal cases this requirement of unanimity extends to
all issues-character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment-which are left
to the jury. A verdict embodies in a single finding the conclusions by the jury upon
all the questions submitted to it." Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1947).
173. 18 U.S.C. §567 (1946).
174. Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 9-201 (1945).
175. LA. Rrv. STAT. tit. 15, §409 (1950).
176. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 43-2153 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005
(1933); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 27, §500 (1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit.
2A, c. 113 §§ 2, 4 (1953); ORE. Comn'. LAWs ANN. tit. 23, c. 4, § 23-411 (1940);
S.C. CODE § 16-52 (1952) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §6204 (1949). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
c. 14, § 14-17 (Supp. 1951), which indicates that the recommendation is not a part
of the verdict by the following: "Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict
in open court, the jury shall so recommend. .. ."
177. People v. Leary, 105 Cal. 486 (1895); Catalina v. People, 104 Colo. 585,
93 P.2d 897 (1939) ; Morrow v. State, 168 Ga. 575, 148 S.E. 500 (1929) ; State v.
O'Donnell, 176 Iowa 337, 157 N.W. 870 (1916); Spurlock v. Commonwealth, 311
Ky. 238, 223 S.W.2d 910 (1949) ; State v. Butner, 220 P.2d 631 (Nev. 1950) ; State
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that it would be an unconstitutional delegation of power to review the
jury's determination. 7 1 On the other hand, three states have held that
the court may reduce the punishment from death to life imprison-
ment.'-" The reasoning of the Idaho court's decision in this respect
is as follows: the jury's determination of punishment is a judicial act;
the Idaho statute allowing the jurors to determine the punishment is
permissive, and if they leave the question of punishment to the judge,
his determination may be modified for an abuse of discretion; the court
has the power to review any decision of the district court, and the
jury is as much a part of the court as the judge; therefore, the deter-
mination of the jury may be modified.8 °
Seventeen states including Idaho have statutes giving the appellate
court power to modify the lower court's sentence.' 8 ' There are certain
advantages to be obtained by this. Since the jury is an untrained and
inexperienced group, it seems that to prevent arbitrary action, there
would be a greater need to review the jury's determination than to
review that of the trial judge. Similarly, because of the constant
change of personnel on juries, there is little likelihood of developing
uniformity of treatment in corresponding cases.
The court on appeal has the ability to reverse the case if during
the trial there has been an error in relation to the question of punish-
ment. For example, if the judge failed to instruct the jury as to their
power to impose less than the death sentence, the death penalty would
not be allowed to stand. The problem is whether the court may then
impose a lower penalty, or whether it must remand the case for a new
trial: To require the latter is time consuming and expensive. If there
was a prejudicial error during the trial upon the question of punish-
ment and the jury imposed death, the court on appeal could vacate
this sentence and impose life imprisonment subject to protest. If either
objected, the case could be remanded for a retrial upon the question of
punishment.
v. Ames, 80 N.E.2d 168 (Ct. App. Ohio 1947) ; State v. Casey, 108 Ore. 386, 213
Pac. 771 (1923); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949);
Walker v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 329, 161 S.W.2d 1077 (1942); State v. Lantzer,
55 Wyo. 230, 99 P.2d 73 (1940).
178. State v. O'Donnell, 176 Iowa 337, 345, 157 N.W. 870, 873 (1916).
179. Davis v. State, 155 Ark. 245, 244 S.W. 750 (1922); State v. Ramirez, 34
Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279 (1921); Hubka v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. 161, 267 Pac. 864
(1928). But see Hildreth v. State, 215 Ark. 808, 811, 223 S.W.2d 757, 758 (1949).
180. State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 634, 203 Pac. 279, 282-283 (1921).
181. OaRFmD, CRIMINAL APPEALs IN A amUcA 104 (1939); Hall, Reduction of
Criminal Seuteices on Appeal, 37 COL. L. Rzv. 521, 525 (1937). Under this statute
Pennsylvania has allowed modification without remanding when the judge imposed
death upon a plea of guilty. Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl.
733 (1932). Since 1939 California has enacted a similar statute, but its court hold-
ings have been contrary to those of Pennsylvania. See People v. Odle, 37 Cal.2d
52, 230 P.2d 345 (1951) ; People v. Thomas, 37 Cal.2d 74, 230 P.2d 351 (1951).
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REMEDIAL LEGISLATION
At the outset, it must be recognized that legislation which would
establish uniformity of punishment for all convicted persons would
solve the problems raised in this paper. However, to return to a
system of mandatory death would be to resurrect the problem of jury
nullification. On the other hand, to argue for absolute abolition of
capital punishment would be a waste of time, since the value of capital
punishment is incapable of proof 182 and there is little to add to the
already vofuminous literature upon the subject.'8 This discussion,
therefore, will assume the merit in the differentiation of punishment
based upon the facts involved in a particular case. The investigation
must concern itself solely with the questions of who should make
the determination and what legislation should be enacted should the
jury continue to exercise the discretion in regard to punishment.
Who Should Determine Punishment
Jury.-At the present time the great majority of jurisdictions
provide for the jury to decide when the death penalty shall be im-
posed." ' In the United States, the only other agency allowed to make
such a decision when the defendant has not pleaded guilty, is the trial
judge, but even then the jury has a right of recommendation." 5 The
apparent reason for having the jury perform this function is that the
procedure minimizes the possibility of jury nullification. As may be
deduced from the concept of jury nullification, the jury has always
played an influential part in the determination of punishment by rendi-
tion of general verdicts.'" 8 They may still acquit by a general verdict
when the defendant is obviously guilty, or find a defendant who is
obviously guilty of murder in the highest degree, guilty of a lower de-
gree of murder or of manslaughter. Therefore, the effect of the dis-
cretion concerning punishment is to reduce the number of cases in
which the jurors will resort to nullification, not to preclude completely
the possibility of that nullification.
182. SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 370 (1924); see MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRIME
LAW AND SOCIAL SCINCE 181 (1933) for a criticism of the past studies upon the
efficacy of capital punishment; and the same book at 366-367 wherein it is said that
in our present state of ignorance all treatment of offenders is based upon conjecture.
See also Sutherland, Murder and the Death Penalty, 15 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
522 et seq. (1924).
183. For a partial list of articles dealing with the death penalty see Henderson,
Capital Punishment 1910-1925 (A Selected Bibliography), 17 J. CRIm. L. & CIMI-
NOLoGY 117 (1926). That the subject is not of sufficient importance to justify the
great amount of literature already written, see SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 376
(1924); BARNES AND TEEms, NEW HoRIzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 426 (1945).
184. Note 6 supra.
185. See note 7 supra.
186. See note 18 supra.
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Actually, differentiation of punishment, regardless of who exer-
cises the discretion,"8 7 would decrease the possibility of jury nullifica-
tion. If somebody else were to exercise the discretion, the jurors would
be relieved of any responsibility for the punishment, other than the
difference between the lowest alternative penalty for murder and the
highest for a lesser included crime. They would then be able to devote
their entire energies to the determination of guilt. It would seem
that other methods of control, i.e., special verdicts, imposed upon a
system giving somebody other than the jury discretion as to punish-
ment would be at least as effective as the present method in preventing
nullification.
Exemptions from jury service tend to eliminate those people most
likely to be aware of the basic considerations necessary to an intelligent
choice of punishment.i' S Many jurors, without suitable backgrounds
for the task, face a unique duty with insufficient time in which to be-
come cognizant of what is required of them. Even if they do have
the time, they lack the incentive to master relevant subjects because
of the small likelihood that they will ever again be confronted with a
similar situation. 89 The dangers of arbitrary action by jurors in
determining the punishment could be minimized by requiring (1)
that the exercise of discretion be based upon the evidence; (2) that
evidence relevant solely to punishment be admissible only if it does
not prejudice the jury upon the issue of guilt; (3) that the judge be
required to comment upon the evidence; and (4) that the appellate
court be allowed to modify the judgment on appeal. Even these rules
would not eliminate the possibility of arbitrary action. There can be
no uniformity of punishment for like offenders, and the interests of the
187. That the possibility of nullification may depend upon what the jury feels
the sentencing body may do, see Michael and Wechsler, A Ratimale of the Law of
Homicide, 37 COL. L. Rnv. 1261, 1267 n. 19 (1937).
188. For some typical statutes granting exemption from jury duty see: ALA.
CODE ANN. tit. 30, 8 3 (1940); CAL CIV. CODE § 200 (1949); ILL. ANN. STATS.
c. 78, § 3 (1935); Ky. REv. STATS. § 29.030 (1948); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28
(Cum. Supp. 1952); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. c. 12, § 12-103 (1945). The profes-
sional members of society--i.e., attorneys, ministers, physicians, teachers, pharmacists
and editors- are generally exempt from jury service. Cf. CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 95,
§ 1 (Cum. Supp. 1949) which reads as follows: "The judge of the courts in which
the trial of the case for which prospective jurors have been summoned shall have
the right to exempt from involuntary service those persons whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, is necessary for the care of other persons, and those persons
upon whom such service would work undue hardship. . .. )P
189. "I would on no account leave to the jury either the question whether the
circumstances of mitigation existed, except in the case of insanity, or the question
whether the sentence should be mitigated. There is no subject on which the im-
pression of a knot of unknown and irresponsible persons, who have to decide at a
moment's notice without reflection, is less to be trusted than the question whether or
not the punishment of death should be inflicted in a given case." 3 STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 86 (1883). See also, 1' WIGMOR,
EVIDENcE § 194(b) (3d ed. 1940) ; Michael and Wechsler, sapra note 187, at 1310-
11; and FL=, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA 133, 161 (1931).
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state as well as the defendant will be jeopardized as long as the jury is
allowed to fix the punishment.
Judge or Judges.-Advantages of placing the determination of
punishment at the discretion of the trial judge or of a panel of judges
en banc, are (1) that the judge or judges represent an experienced
group, (2) that the judge or judges are aware of the purpose of pun-
ishment, and (3) that the possibility of reversal for errors upon the
problem of punishment would be greatly reduced.
If determining the punishment is left to the trial judge alone,
there might be a hesitancy to assume responsibility for the imposition
of the death penalty. 9 ' On the other hand, while a panel of judges
might obviate the problem of undue reluctance to impose capital pun-
ishment, this solution raises procedural difficulties. Much of the evi-
dence introduced upon the issue of guilt is relevant to the question of
punishment also, and some way must be found to inform the judges
who did not sit in the trial of guilt about evidence presented at that
time. A copy of the record would be sufficient when the evidence was
uncontroverted, but when facts are subject to conflicting testimonies,
the record is of little value in determining the veracity and the relia-
bility of witnesses. The general verdict of the jury demonstrates the
finding as to the ultimate fact of guilt. Similarly, it shows that state
witnesses convinced the jury of the truth of certain crucial points.
However, it does not necessarily indicate that the testimony of these
witnesses was believed upon all points which might have been subjects
of conflicting evidence. For instance if defendant's character was
brought into issue, a verdict of guilty does not declare that the state's
evidence regarding his character was believed.' 9'
Since both the record and the general verdict are deficient in meet-
ing the need, if the penalty is to be determined by a panel of judges, it
would probably be necessary to require the jury to find special verdicts
upon disputed facts which although not controlling as to guilt are rele-
vant to punishment.
If the system of special verdicts proved to be too cumbersome and
productive of error to be of value, a system of probational reports
might be devised. This would require a determination of facts rele-
vant to punishment by a trained agency under the direction of the panel
of judges. Such a report would, of course, be subject to disproof by
the defendant but the contents, along with evidence introduced at the
hearing as to punishment, and the verdict of the jury upon the issue
190. Note, Should the Jury Fix the PuwishinIzt for Crinies, 24 VA. L. REv.
462, 465 (1938).
191. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw § 398 (12th ed. 1932) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE: §330 et seq. (11th ed. 1935).
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of guilt, should provide sufficient factual material upon which to exer-
cise intelligent discretion.
As previously noted, states which provide that a judge determine
the punishment allow the jury to recommend that the defendant be
imprisoned for life. In Utah, New York and Delaware a judge may
not impose a penalty other than death unless the jury recommends
life imprisonment, although he may impose the death sentence in spite
of such a recommendation if he so desires.'92 In South Dakota the
judge may not impose death unless the jury recommends that he do
so, but similarly, he may ignore the recommendation and impose life
imprisonment if he wishes. 9 The fact that the jury's recommenda-
tion is a prerequisite to the judge's exercise of the discretion makes
both types of the above statutes undesirable. If a panel of judges is
better qualified to determine the punishment, its exercise of discretion
should not be circumscribed by requiring the concurrence of a less
efficient group.
However, when the discretion as to punishment is placed in a
panel of judges, the possibility of nullification very likely depends upon
the jury's guess as to what the judges will do in case of conviction.1
94
Here would appear to be the greatest value of the recommendation,
for if the jury is permitted to recommend a term of life imprisonment
and knows that its recommendation is likey to be considered seriously,
the possibility of nullification would be further alleviated. How much
weight the judges should give the recommendation is difficult to de-
termine. It should certainly not be controlling; neither should it be
arbitrarily discarded or it will lose its value in preventing jury nullifi-
cation. It would be best if the judges, in reaching their determination
of the punishment, would consider the recommendation of the jury
only in connection with all other relevant facts.
Board of Experts to Impose Punishment.-A third possible body
for the determination of punishment might be a board of experts in
related fields,' whose sole function would be to prescribe the penalty.'9"
192. Dim. REv. CODE c. 155, § 5330 (1935); N.Y. PENlI.. LAw § 1045; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-30-4 (1953). The Utah statute is perhaps typical: "Every person
guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or upon the recommendation
of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison for life, in the dis-
cretion of the court."
193. S.D. Laws 1939, c. 30, p. 40.
194. Michael and Wechsler, supra note 187, at 1267.
195. One suggestion is that the board be composed of "a psychiatrist or
psychologist, a socialist and a lawyer." Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code,
41 HARV. L. REv. 453, 476 (1928); cf. Gausewitz, Cosiderations Bas'ic to a New
Penal Code 11 Wis. L. REv. 480, 508 (1936) (recommended that board members be
chosen for general wisdom rather than for any special background or specialty).
196. Glueck, supra note 195, at 477.
"It would be preferable from the standpoint of a scientific program to have
these legal agencies decide only whether the offender has committed the anti-social
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The proposal that such a group undertake to impose the punishment,
the judge and jury having determined the guilt of the accused, has been
made in regard to the whole field of criminal law ... and in regard to
certain limited types of offenders,"98 but not specifically for murder
cases. The reason for this is that a board would concern itself pri-
marily with the need for incapacitation and reformation, and since the
difference between life imprisonment and the death penalty lies in the
deterrent effect of the two punishments, a group of experts is not de-
signed to function effectively in such cases. The great value of the
board lies in its continued control over the prisoner."' 9 To be effective,
the experts must have it within their power to control the handling of
the offender, to check his progress while he is being treated, and finally,
to release him when he is fit to be returned to society. Whether or not
such a program should supplant life imprisonment as the alternative
to the death penalty is not in issue here. The present problem is the
question of who should make the initial decision as to whether the de-
fendant should be allowed to continue to live.
Since the board of experts is not primarily designed for deter-
mining whether the death sentence should be imposed, and since the
act, and, once having established that he has done that act, forthwith turn him over to
a diagnostic board set up for the purpose of determining what further is to be done
with him. This would dispose of the defense of insanity and other mental incom-
petency defenses. This result obviously is a desirable objective, for these defenses
impede the program of protecting society. The insane criminal manifestly is a
major menance to society. It would also render superfluous the orthodox legal tests
on insanity and would make the division of crimes into degrees unnecessary." Harno,
Rationale of A Criminal Code, 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 549, 560 (1937).
197. Glueck, supra note 195, at 457; Gausewitz, =pra note 195, at 499 et seq.
198. The Youth Correction Authority Acts are examples of the application of
the suggestion to cases involving juveniles. See also HALT, LAW, THEFr AND
SocIE=rY 288 et seq. (1935) wherein Professor Hall advocates complete individualiza-
tion of treatment for persons convicted of petty larceny. In 1947 the New York
Legislature passed a bill providing that sexual psychopaths might be confined in-
definitely until cured. Governor Dewey vetoed this bill and in 1948 the legislature
directed that a study of the causes of sex crimes and the treatment for such offenders
be made.
199. "§ 28 (2) The Authority shall make periodic reexaminations for all persons
within its control for the purpose of determining whether or not existing orders and
dispositions in individual cases should be modified or continued in force. .. ."
"§29 (1) The Authority shall keep under continued study all persons who are
in its control and shall retain them subject to the limitations of sections 28(4) and
32, under supervision and control so long as in its judgment such control is neces-
sary for the protection of the public."
Section 28(4) deals with the situation wherein the board fails to examine a
person commited to it within two years of a previous examination. In such case,
upon petition by the committed person, the court will discharge such person unless
the Authority satisfies the court of the necessity of further control. Section 32 deals
with steps the Authority must take to retain control over a person after such person
attains a given age. A.L.I., YOUTH CoRREcrioN AUTHRIOaT AcT (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1940).
See also Glueck, stpra note 195, at 477; SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 609 (1924).
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jury is an inefficient and arbitrary agency with respect to that issue,
discretion as to punishment should be given either to the trial judge or
to a panel of judges. The former is the more convenient procedurally,
whereas the latter has substantive value in that it negates individual
responsibility for the death sentence. However, one of the policies of
the statutes providing for alternative punishments is to make imposi-
tion of death dependent upon the facts of the particular case, 2°° and if
a judge would be hesitant to impose capital punishment because of the
pressure of responsibility, he would not be inflicting the penalty re-
quired by the facts of the case. On the other hand, an adequate proce-
dural device could be found either in the requirement of special verdicts
by the jury upon facts relevant to punishment but not controlling as to
guilt, or by the employment of reports prepared by a special fact-finding
group. Thus it would seem best that punishment be determined by a
panel of judges sitting en banc.
RECOMMENDED CHANGES IF JURY CONTINUES TO DETERMINE
PUNISHMENT
It may be anticipated that legislatures will be slow to enact legis-
lation taking the duty of determining the punishment from the jury.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider what innovations might be made
to improve the present system.
In recent years, there has been considerable agitation in Pennsyl-
vania to establish a system of separate hearings for the issue of guilt
and the question of punishment. Indeed, a chapter in the proposed
criminal code of 1949 was designed to effectuate such a system. How-
ever, Governor Duff vetoed the proposed code, so both are still deter-
mined at a single hearing. The necessity of a statutory provision estab-
lishing a second hearing for determining punishment is most pressing
in Pennsylvania, because in that state evidence of other crimes may
be introduced prior to conviction.20' The system of double hearings
would seem to assume that the exercise of discretion must be based
upon the evidence, and that evidence relevant solely to punishment is
admissible only in the second hearing. Equally obvious is the fact that
evidence relevant solely to punishment cannot prejudice the jury upon
the issue of guilt, since it would be admissible only in the second hear-
ing. Other benefits to be derived from this system would be the elim-
ination of the anomaly of the defendant's attorney asking for an acquit-
tal and a life sentence in the same argument, the clarification of the
issues in the jurors' minds, and the simplification of instructions, i.e.,
200. See note 30 supra.
201. Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atd. 904 (1928).
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there would be no necessity for instructions limiting the use of evidence
to one or the other issue. In addition, an error in regard to punish-
ment would not necessitate disturbing the conviction. With regard to
this, the proposed statute should require the verdict of guilty to be
recorded immediately after its rendition. This would avoid discredit-
ing that verdict when the only error pertained to punishment, and
would also prevent a juror from changing his mind subsequent to the
rendition of the verdict but prior to the determination of punishment.
It is obvious that the statute should require that the hearing as to pun-
ishment follow immediately after the rendition of the verdict. The jury
should not be subjected to outside pressure between the two hearings,
and also, since much of the evidence relevant to guilt is relevant to
punishment as well, the hearing upon the latter issue should be held
while all the evidence is still fresh in the jurors' minds.
Another provision should require the trial judge to sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment, should the jury disagree as to punish-
ment. This would avoid the necessity of obtaining a new jury and
having a rehearing upon the question of punishment. Admittedly,
this provision would tend to limit the infliction of capital punishment,
but such a result would, as demonstrated at the beginning of this paper,
be quite in accord with the present trend. There is no reason to believe
that such a result would be detrimental to society's interests. Other
provisions should require the judge to comment upon the weight and
significance pf the evidence, and allow the appellate court to lower the
sentence from death to life imprisonment if it finds prejudicial error
in the hearing upon punishment or feels that the jury has abused its
discretion. The value of these sections has already been discussed.
While it is submitted that a panel of judges is better able to deter-
mine the question of punishment, it would seem that if the jury is to
continue to perform this function, the above statutory provisions ought
to be enacted. The system today is haphazard and arbitrary in most
states, and in Pennsylvania it creates an obvious injustice insofar as
the prosecution uses the jury's discretion concerning punishment as a
pretext to introduce evidence which may prejudice them upon the issue
of guilt. The proposed legislation would tend to minimize the arbitrary
character of the jury's decision, and more important, would prevent
prejudice upon the issue of guilt without depriving the jury of relevant
evidence upon which to exercise its discretion concerning punishment.
